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LEGISLATIVE NOTES:
THE EDUCATI.ON OF ALL HANDICAPPED CHILDREN
ACT OF 1975

The Education of All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 1 purports to confirm a national commitment to full equality of educational opportunity for the nation's eight million handicapped children2 by means of an expanded program of financial a~sistance to
the states to aid them in the massive court-mandated effort 3 to
provide an education for every handicapped child. This legislation
commits the federal government to assist the states in meeting the
direct costs of educating handicapped children. 4 To qualify for
the federal subvention, an educational agency is required to establish an individualized educational program 5 for every handicapped
child and to implement a system of procedural safeguards which
guarantees due process in placement and programming decisions
'Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (Supp. V. 1975)).
The proposed regulations of the Office of Education pertaining to this Act were published
for comment on December 30, 1976. 41 Fed. Reg. 56,966 (1976). The final regulations were
scheduled to be promulgated at the end of March, 1977, to become effective October I, 1977.
The manuscript of this Note was completed prior to the publication of the proposed
regulations. An effort has been made to take account of the provisions contained in the
proposed regulations in the relatively few instances where they have either shed additional
light on the substance of the 1975 Act or raised unforeseen difficulties. For the most part the
proposed regulations have merely incorporated the language of the Act. For this reason it is
not expected that the final regulations will have a substantial impact upon the analysis and
conclusions of this Note.
'The Bureau for the Education of the Handicapped placed the number of handicapped
children between birth and age twenty-one in 1974 at more than eight million. H.R. REP. No.
332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. I I (1975); S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1975). The
Bureau estimated that I. 75 million handicapped children were receiving no educational
services in 1974, while another 2.5 million were receiving "an inappropriate education."
H.R. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess 11 (1975).
The term "handicapped children", as amended by the 1975 Act, includes "mentally
retarded, hard of hearing, deaf, speech impaired, visually handicapped, seriously emotionally disturbed, orthopedically impaired, or other health impaired children, or children with
specific learning disabilities who by reason thereof require special education and related
services." 20 U .S.C. § 1401(1)(Supp. V 1975). The categories of handicap enumerated in the
statutory definition are defined in the Proposed Regulations, § 12 la.4, 41 Fed. Reg. 56,977
(1976).
3
See notes 7-23 and accompanying text infra.
•see notes 61-68 and 98-117 and accompanying text infra for consideration of the 1975
Act's funding provisions. The estimated cost to the federal government of the program, if
fully funded, would be approximately $3.1 billion per annum by fiscal 1982. 121 CONG. REc.
Hll,348 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1975). This is roughly ten times the amount appropriated for
fiscal 1977 ($315 million). Departments of Labor and Health, Education and Welfare,
Appropriate Act, 1977, Act of Sept. 30, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-439, 90 Stat. 1427. It has been
estimated that state and local expenditures on the education of the handicapped in 1972-73
totaled $3.2 million for slightly more than three million handicapped children. Hearings un
H.R. 70 Before the Select Subcomm. on Education of the House Comm. on Education and
Labor, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 29, 31 (1974).
5
See notes 89-93 and accompanying text and Part V A infra.
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and provides a grievance mechanism that includes the right to bring
a civil action. 6
This note discusses the principal provisions of the 1975 Acl as
they relate to the developing law of the educational rights of handicapped children. These provisions are considered from two
perspectives: their operational meaning or effect on the implementation of educational programs for handicapped children, and the
role they may play in future legal efforts to obtain an education for
every handicapped child appropriate to his or her special needs.
The note is divided into five sections. Part I reviews the landmark judicial decisions which have established the right of handicapped children to participate in free, public education. The basic
provisions of the Education of All Handicapped Children Act of
1975 are then presented in Part II. The funding provisions are
discussed in Part III with particular emphasis upon the tension
between the promise of federal largesse and the expense of compliance with statutory and judicial requirements. Part IV reviews
prior efforts to obtain judicial recognition of a substantive right to
an appropriate education and suggests some ways in which the
1975 Act may alter the framework of judicial consideration of this
endeavor. Finally, Part V examines in detail the Act's provisions
for individualized educational programs and procedural
safeguards. The utility of these provisions to persons who seek to
hold educational agencies accountable for their special education
programs is stressed. In addition, particular attention is paid to
certain legal problems that are likely to emerge from the implementation of the complaint procedure incorporated into the 1975 Act.

I. JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF THE HANDICAPPED
CHILD'S RIGHT TO EDUCATION

Mandatory special education for all handicapped children acquired constitutional momentum in the early 1970's when two
federal courts indicated that the exclusion of handicapped children
from public education could be a denial of their constitutional
rights to equal protection and due process. In Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 7 [P.A.R.C.] a
class action on behalf of mentally retarded children excluded from
the public schools as uneducable or untrainable, a three-judge
federal court approved a consent decree in which the parties
6
7

See notes 94-97 and accompanying text and Part V B in/ra.
343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972), modifying 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
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agreed that all mentally retarded children were capable of benefiting from a program of education and training. 8 The public school
officials were required to place each mentally retarded child in "a
free, public program of education and training appropriate to the
child's capacity .... " 9 The court found that the labeling of a child
as mentally retarded imposed a serious stigma; 10 therefore, it concluded that full due process protections must be afforded to the
child before such a label could be imposed by the school. 11
The principles enunciated in P.A.R.C. were extended to all
handicapped children in Mills v. Board of Education. 12 The court
held that no handicapped child could be excluded from a regular
public school assignment unless the child was provided "(a)
adequate alternative educational services suited to the child's
needs, which may include special education or tuition grants, and
(b) a constitutionally adequate prior hearing and periodic review of
the child's status, progress, and the adequacy of any educational
alternative." 13 The District of Columbia was ordered to provide
each child of school age "a free and suitable publicly-supported
education regardless of the degree of the child's mental, physical or
emotional disability or impairment." 14 A constitutional basis for
this obligation was found in the principle expounded in Brown v.
Board of Education 15 that ''where the state has undertaken to
provide [the opportunity of an education, that opportunity] is a
right which must be made available to all on equal terms." 16 By
denying handicapped children access to publicly-supported education, the District of Columbia had violated the due process
clause . 17 The school system's defense of insufficient funds was
rejected on the ground that the District's interest in educating the
excluded children outweighed its interest in preserving its financial
resources. 18 If sufficient funds were not available, the court said,
then the available funds must be expended in such a manner that no
child would be entirely excluded from a publicly supported education .19

8
Id. at 307.
"Id.
10
Id. at 293.
"Id. at 303-04.
12
348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
13
/d. at 878.
••Id.
15
347 u .s. 483 (1954).
16
348 F. Supp. 866, 875 (D.D.C. 1972), quoting 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (emphasis
deleted).
17
348 F. Supp. at 875.
18
/d. at 876.
9
' /d.
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Despite some well-reasoned concern regarding the precise scope
and precedential value of P.A.R.C. and Mills, 20 these decisions
served as a springboard for the vigorous assertion of the constitutional right to education for all handicapped children. Three fundamental propositions from these cases have served as the underpinnings of the asserted right to education. First, the equal opportunity principle enunciated in Brown v. Board of Education 21 will
be applied to the practice of excluding handicapped children from
public education. 22 Second, identification, classification, and
placement of handicapped children must be accompanied by full
procedural due process safeguards. 23 The P.A.R.C. decision also
embraced an educational notion that has become a vital corollary
of the equal protection principle. The court found that every handicapped child could benefit from some type of education or training. 24 As a result it was no longer necessary to show that the
20
Handel, The Role of the Advocate-in Securing the Handicapped Child's Right to an
Effective Minimal Education, 36 Omo ST. L.J. 349, 357 n.45 (1975); Comment, The Handicapped Child Has a Right to an Appropriate Education, 55 NEB. L. REV. 637, 694 n.39
(1967); Hearings on H.R. 70 Before Select Subcomm. on Education of the House Comm. on
Education and Labor, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 227, 229 (1974) (testimony of J. Stanley Pottinger,
Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, Department of Justice).
Neither case involved a full-scale trial on the merits. In P.A.R.C. discussion of the
plaintiffs constitutional claims was limited to a jurisdictional determination of the existence
of colorable claims of constitutional violations. 243 F. Supp. at 279, 283 n.8, 293-97. In Mills
the court breifly addressed the constitutional issues after the defendants failed to fulfill an
interim stipulation and consent order. However, since the District of Columbia did not
dispute its obligation to provide education for handicapped children but simply pleaded
insufficient resources as a defense, 348 F. Supp. at 866,871, 875-76, the court's discussion of
equal protection was limited to demonstrating the applicability of this principle to the denial
of education for the handicapped. 348 F. Supp. at 866, 875.
Despite the concerns over their value as legal precedents, P.A.R.C. and Mills have been
frequently treated as representing judicial recognition of the handicapped child's right to a
public education. See, e.g., Herr, Retarded Children and the Law: Enforcing the Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Retarded, 23 SyRACUSE L. REV. 995, 1008 (1972); McClung,
Do Handicapped Children Have a Legal Right to a Minimally Adequate Education?, 3 J.L.
& Eouc. 153 (1974); see also H.R. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1975).
21
347 u .s. 483 (1954).
22
This principle appears in both P.A.R.C., 343 F. Supp. at 297, and Mills, 348 F. Supp. at
875. Commentators have also used the Brown principle as their point of departure in arguing
for the right to education of handicapped children. See, e.g., Dimond, The Constitutional
Right to Education: The Quiet Revolution, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 1087 (1973); SCHWARTZ, The
Education of Handicapped Children: Emerging Legal Doctrines, 7 CLEARINGHOUSE REv.
125 (1973).
23
Once again the decisional position of P.A.R.C. and Mills made it uncertain whether the
full complement of procedural safeguards obtained in the opinions were constitutionally
required. The courts in both cases approved sets of procedures previously agreed to by the
parties which included prior notice, a trial-type hearing, rights to counsel, presentation of
evidence, cross-examination of witnesses, impartial hearing officer, and a written decision
based upon the record with the burden of proof on the educational agency. Pennsylvania
Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 304-05 (E.D. Pa. 1972);
Mills v. Board of Education, 348 F. Supp. 866, 880-81 (D.D.C. 1972). ·in neither instance,
however, did the court expressly state that handicapped children were entitled to all of these
procedures as a matter of constitutional right. See note 40 infra for a fuller consideration of
the constitutional question left open by P.A.R.C. and Mills.
24 Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 296 (E.D.
Pa. 1972).
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handicapped child could fit into the existing educational program;
rather the program had to be tailored to the child's needs.
A.

Equal Protection

Following the breakthrough created by P.A.R.C. and Mills,
counsel and commentators fashioned a broad spectrum of arguments designed to buttress and expand the basic principles enunciated in those cases. Perhaps the greatest effort and attention was
devoted to the application of equal protection to the condition of
handicapped children. Even after P.A.R.C. and Mills the exclusion
of handicapped children continued, and advocates were therefore
anxious to invoke the strict scrutiny standard of equal protection
analysis, knowing that few discriminatory classifications could
withstand judicial application of this standard. 25
1. Suspect Class - The contention was made that handicapped
children qualified as a "suspect" class because they were a vulnerable and stigmatized minority, lacking in political power and frequently subject to discrimination. 26 Consequently, it was argued
that legislative classifications that caused the suspfct "handicapped" category to be invoked, for example, statutory exceptions to
compulsory attendance laws, should be subjected to strict scrutiny
and overturned if found to constitute invidious discrimination. 27
This argument has met with some success in the courtroom. 28
2. Fundamental Interest - Advocates have also sought to
employ the other catalyst of strict scrutiny, "fundamental interests." It was believed that the Supreme Court's statement in
Brown v. Board of Education that "[t]oday education is perhaps

25 The strict scrutiny standard of equal protection analysis is discussed in.Developments in
the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV ..L. REv. 1065 (1969)..
Typically, compulsory school attendance laws have excepted children thought to be
uneducable or otherwise unfit for schooling. The plaintif(s in P.A.R.C. successfully challenged Pennsylvania's statutory exclusions by producing expert evidence that all mentally
retarded children were capable of benefiting from a program of education and training.
Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 296 (E.D. Pa.
1972). With this showing, the rationality of the legislative classification of handicapped
children was undermined and their continued exclusion became an arguable denial of equal
protection. Id. at 297.
Because the P.A.R.C. decision took the form of a consent decree the court did not feel
obliged to decide whether strict scrutiny standards would apply to the education of handicapped children. The court was satisfied that the plaintiffs had established a colorable claim
even under the less stringent rational basis test of equal pfqtection. Id. at 283 n.8.
""Casey, The Supreme Court and the Suspect Class, 40 ~XCEPI"IONAL CHILDREN 119,
(1973); Dimond, supra note 22, at I 100-02; Wald, The Right to Education, 2 LEGAL RIGHTS
OF THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED 833, 836 (1973).
27 Dimond, supra note 22, at I 100-02.
28 See In re G.H., 218 N.W.2d 441 (N.D. 1974). See also Colorado Ass'n for Retarded
Children v. Colorado, No. C-4620 (D.Colo., filed Dec. 22, 1972) (handicapped persons may
constitute a "suspect class").
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the most important function of state and local governments" 29
provided a foundation for the claim that education was either a
constitutional right.or at least a fundamental interest that could not
be denied in the absence of a compelling state interest. 30 But in San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez 31 the Supreme
Court rejected this argument, holding instead that education per se
was neither a constitutionally guaranteed right nor a fundamental
interest. 32
3. Rational Basis - Although Rodriguez was a setback for the
proponents of equal educational opportunity for handicapped children, the "minimum rationality" standard of traditional equal protection33 proved sufficient to propel handicapped children through
the school house door. The courts in both P.A.R.C. and Mills had
found it unnecessary to venture beyond "minimum rationality"
standards to uphold the plaintiffs' claims. 34 The critical factor that
rendered the exclusionary provisions vulnerable to attack was the
judicial acceptance of the proposition that, regardless of the type
and severity of handicap, all children could benefit from some form
of educational program. Upon acceptance of this proposition the
exclusion lost it justification, since the distinction drawn in the
compulsory education statutes between handicapped and nonhandicapped children lacked a rational basis. Administrative and fiscal
excuses might still be offered for the continued exclusion of handicapped children from public education, but these arguments had
already been answered in Mills. 35 Hence, ariy states that excluded

29

347 U.S. at 493.
See, e.g., Comment, Equality and the Schools: Education as a Fundamental Interest,
21 AM. U.L. REV. 716 (1972).
3 '411 U.S. 1 (1973).
32 Mr. Justice Powell's opinion denied that education was a constitutional right on two
grounds. He rejected the argument based on Brown with the observation that "the importance of a service performed by the State does not determine whether it must be regarded as
fundamental for purposes of examination under the Equal Protection clause." 411 U.S. at
30. Recognizing that the right to education was not explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution, he then considered whether it was implicitly guaranteed by virtue of its relationship to
"the effective exercise of First Amendment freedoms and to intelligent utilization of the
right to vote." 411 U.S. at 35. This contention was also rejected. 411 U.S. at 36-37.
33 See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, supra note 25.
34 S ee note 20 supra.
35 See notes 18-19 and accompanying text supra. This is not to say that the courts have
arrived at a wholly satisfactory solution to the problems created by limited fiscal resources.
In Mills the court insisted that the school district fund special education programs even if
that meant an overall reduction in the level of per pupil expenditures throughout the system.
Yet. courts have been reluctant to mandate an "equal dollars" standard of equal educational
opportunity. See, e.g., Fialkowski v. Shapp, 405 F. Supp. 946, 958 (E.D. Pa. 1975). One
course of action may be to require the state to provide additional funds to assure an adequate
educational program for handicapped children. A similar action nas been taken in the area of
desegregation remedies. In Bradley v. Milliken, 540 F.2d 229 (6th Cir. 1976), the District
Court on remand from the Supreme Court ordered the State of Michigan, which had .been
found guilty of ~egregative acts, to pay at least half of the added costs of certain "educa30
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handicapped children from its program of free, public education
would be accused of violating the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment.
B.

Procedural Due Process

Due process demands arose initially with respect to the testing
and classification practices used to exclude individuals from school
or to-place them in special education programs. A series of reports
and cases detailing the misclassification of educationally disadvantaged and non-English speaking children as mentally retarded led
to proposals for due process safeguards. 36 Similar demands were
voiced with respect to the labeling and placement or exclusions of
the genuinely handicapped. 37
In P.A.R.C. and Mills the courts approved procedures designed
to protect the due process rights of handicapped children. These
safeguards included: 38
(a) written notice of the proposed action, with specification of
the reasons therefor, including all relevant data; the right to
an impartial hearing before an impartial hearing officer if the
parents object to the action;
(b) access to all pertinent records and to independent diagnostic services;
(c) right to counsel, to confront and cross-examine witnesses,
and to present evidence; and
(d) a decision by the hearing officer based solely upon the

tional components'.' that the District Court included in the desegregation remedy. 540 F.2d
at 241. In upholding this order the Court of Appeals explained that "[s]ince Michigan State
officers and agencies were guilty of acts which contributed substantially to the unlawful de
jure segregation that exists in Detroit, the State has an obligation not only to eliminate the
unlawful segregation but also to insure that there is no diminution in the quality of education." 540 F.2d at 245. Spokesmen for handicapped persons may well argue that without
adequate funds to operate special education programs appropriate to the needs of handicapped children these children will be as effectively deprived of their rights as are children who
have been subject to segregation and who now face the prospect of a reduced educational
program in order to pay for the costs of desegregation. If a court accepts the analogy
between segregation and exclusion, it may conclude that without funds for adequate special
education programs the right of access to the public school system is being frustrated.
The Education of AU Handicapped Children Act of 1975 represents the congressional
response to the predicament of school districts caught between an overstrained fisc and
judicially supported claims of handicl!lpped children to a ~•full service" education.
36
Dimond, supra note 22, at 1090-91; Kirp, Schools as Sorters: The Constitutional ani:l
Policy Implications of Student Classifications, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 705 (1973). See Larry P.
v. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Diana v. State Board of Education, C-70-37
RFP (N.D. Cal., filed Feb. 5, 1970) (consent decree, June 18, 1973); Hobson v. Hansen, 269
F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), aff d sub nom. Smuck v. Hansen, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
37
Schwartz, supra note 22, at 130-33.
38
Mills v. Board of Education, 348 F. Supp. 866, 880-81 (D.D.C. 1972); Pennsylvania
Ass'n for Retarded Children_ v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 303-05 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
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evidence presented, with the burden of justification on the
educational agency. 39

Following the P.A.R.C. and Mills orders approving the full
panoply of procedural safeguards, advocates maintained that these
provisions were required to protect the "liberty" interest of handicapped children in light of the stigmatization inherent in classification as handicapped and to protect their putative "property" interest in a free, public education. 40

39
The remarkable congruence of the due process provisions in P.A.R.C. and Mills is
marred only by a discrepancy with respect to the burden of proof. lnP.A.R.C. the Amended
Stipulation states that a "proposed change in educational status shall be approved only if
suggested by substantial evidence on the whole record of the hearing" but that introduction
by the educational agency of an official report recommending the change "shall discharge its
burden of going forward with the evidence," thereby requiring the parent to introduce
evidence. 343 F. Supp. at 279,305 (E.D. Pa. 1972). Arguably, the burden of persuasion has
also been shifted to the child and his parents by this language. Compare Mills, which
expressly provides that the defendants (i.e., the educational agency) "shall bear the burden
of proof as to all facts and as to the appropriateness of any placement, denial of placement,
or transfer." 348 F. Supp. at 866, 881 (D.D.C. 1972).
• 0 See, e.g., Wald, supra note 26, at 837; Schwartz, supra note 22, at 128-29; Dimond,
supra note 22, at I l I l-12.
While the purpose of the present discussion is to sketch the legal developments that
presaged congressional enactment of the Education of All Handicapped Children Act,
leaving until later sections the analysis of the legal issues, a few words are in order at this
point concerning the constitutional dimensions of procedural due process as applied to the
admission, classification, and placement of handicapped children. As indicated in note 23
supra, the P.A.R .C. and Mills courts did not pass on whether the extensive procedural
safeguards incorporated in their orders were constitutionally required to assure fundamental
fairness. In Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), which considered the question of the
process due students suspended from school for ten or fewer days, both the majority and
dissenting opinions doubted that the education area was an appropriate place to inject a full
panoply of trial-type procedural safeguards. Id. at 578, 583; id at 590-91 (Powell, J. dissenting). See also, Kirp, Procedura/ism and Bureaucracy: Due Process in the School Setting, 28
ST AN. L. REV. 841 (1976). Although the Court recognized that the extent of the process due
is contingent upon the significance of the possible deprivation of liberty or injury to property
interests, 419 U.S. at 572-76, it imposed only what it called "rudimentary precautions
against unfair or mistaken findings of misconduct and arbitrary exclusion from school." Id.
at 581. These "rudimentary precautions" simply required "in connection with a suspension
of IO days or less, that the student be given oral or written notice of the charge against him
and, if he denies them, an explanation of the evidence ... and an opportunity to present his
side of the story." Id. The Court expressly abjured mandating full trial-type safeguards in
this situation. Id. at 583.
On a broader plane the Supreme Court has been reluctant recently to stretch the due
process clause to the limits reached a few years earlier. Compare Hortonville Joint School
Dist. No. Iv. Hortonville Educ. Ass'n., 426 U.S. 482 (1976), Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341
(1976), Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, reh. denied, 425 U.S. 985 (1976), and Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), with Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), Wisconsin v.
Constantineau, 400 U.S .. 433 (1971), and Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). Whether
this represents a wholesale retreat, Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. at 351 (Brennan, J. dissenting), or merely the principled application of the due process calculus, it does indicate that,
depending on the circumstances, handicapped children may be entitled as a matter of
constitutional law to fewer procedural safeguards than either the advocates or the P.A.R.C.
and Mills orders would suggest.
The uncertainties regarding the constitutional dimensions of due process only serve to
emphasize the significance of the 1975 Act in this•area. The Act mandates as a condition for
financial assistance the implementation of the full range of procedural safeguards adopted in
P.A.R.C. and Mills. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (Supp. V 1975). See Part V B 3 infra.
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Right to Education

A third constitutional claim is the substantive right to an effective education. 41 Although its appearance in the education of the
. handicapped area has been limited thus far to a few ~ases involving
tuition grants to private schools42 and educational programs for the
institutionalized handicapped, 43 this claim may become the basis
for considerable legal conflict in the near future. 44
The notion that underlies this position is that the right to education is meaningless unless the programs are responsive to the
special needs of handicapped children. The legal foundation for
this claim has not been fully developed, although its basic outlines
are visible. Rather than attemping to specify educational content or
techniques, proponents have sought to establish that a substantive
right to an effective education is implicit in present law. For example, one advocate has drawn upon the intimation in Rodriguez of a
right to a minimum education to support the claim of handicapped
children to an education that is appropriate to their needs. 45 Others
have built their claims to an effective education upon state constitutional or statutory provisions that assure educational opportunities for all. 46 Regardless of the legal theories employed, however, the courts will be asked to rule that the right to education for
handicapped children necessarily requires educational agencies to
provide programs that are appropriate to these children's needs
and that meet those needs effectively .47
II. THE EDUCATION OF ALL HANDICAPPED
CHILDREN ACT OF 1975

A.

Prior State and Federal Legislation

Education in the United States has traditionally been regarded as
41
The issue of the scope and nature of.the right to an education is broader than the· issue,
discussed in Part I A 2, of whether any such right is a "fundamental interest."
42
See, e.g., In re Held, Docket Nos. H-2-71 and H-10-71 (Family Court, Westchester
County, New York, Nov. 29, 1971); Kivell v. Nimointin, Civil No. 143913 (Sup. Ct.
Fairfield County, Conn., filed July 18, 1972). Both of these unreported cases are collected in
L. BURRELLO, H. DEYOUNG & L. COLEMAN, A COMPILATION AND REVIEW OF LITIGATION AFFECTING THE HANDICAPPED 202-03 (N .D.) (on file with the UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF LAW REFORM).
43
See, e.g., Wyatt
Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (1971), 334 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala.
1972).
44
The legal bases for asserting such a claim and the impact of the 1975 Act on theseassertions are more fully discussed in Part IV.
45
Handel, supra note 20, at 363. See also Note, The Right of Handicapped Children to an
Education: The Phoenix of Rodriguez, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 519 (1974).
46
See McClung, supra note 20, at 166-72.
47
The eligibility and state plan requirements in the Education of All Handicapped Children
Act of 1975 as vehicles for asserting the claim to an appropriate education are examined in
Part V B 2 infra.

v.

FALL

1976]

Education of Handicapped Children Act

119

a responsibility of the states. In keeping with the critical socializing
role assigned to education forty-nine states have enacted compulsory education laws of one form or another. 48 In addition, numerous state constitutions guarantee basic educational rights to their
citizens. 49 Notwithstanding these provisions, however, handicapped children have often been excluded from public education by
virtue of exceptions to the compulsory attendance laws. 50 A few
states had developed alternative programs for some categories of
handicapped children at an early date. Yet as recently as 1971, a
year prior to the P.A.R.C. and Mills decisions, only seven states
had adopted mandatory education legislation that included all
handicapped children, while twenty-six additional states had mandatory programs for one or more catergories of handicaps. 51
Involvement of the federal government in the education of handicapped children commenced in 1966 when Title VI was added by
amendment to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act
(ESEA) of 1965. 52 Title VI established a grant program "for the
purpose of assisting the states in the initiation, expansion, and
improvement of programs and projects (including the acquisition of
equipment and where necessary the construction of school
facilities) for the education of handicapped children. " 53 In 1970 a
separate Education of Handicapped Children Act was enacted to
replace the ESEA's Title Vl. 54 The basic thrust of the program,
however, remained the development of educational resources and
the training of personnel.
After P.A.R.C. and Mills legislative efforts intensified on both
the state and federal levels. Spurred by an increasing number of
court actions, virtually every state enacted some form of mandatory special education legislation. 55 Meanwhile, Congress began
consideration of an expanded program of federal assistance. The
effort first bore fruit in the Education of the Handicapped Amendments of 1974. 56 The new provisions evidenced the impact of
recent adjudication on congressional attitudes. For the first time

48 Note, The Right of Handicapped Children to an Education: The Phoenix of Rodriguez,
supra note 45, at 522 n.9.
49
f. WEINTRAUB, A. ABESON, & D. BRADDOCK, STATE LAW AND EDUCATION OF
HANDICAPPED CHILDREN: ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS ) I (1971).
0
• Jd. at I 1-12.
51
H.R. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1975).
52 Pub. L. No. 89-750, § I 6 I, 80 Stat. I 204 (I 966), amending Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27
(1965).
53 Pub. L. No. 89-750, § 161, 80 Stat. 1204 (1966).
54 Pub. L. No. 91-230, §§ 601-662, 84 Stat. 175 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1970),
amending Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Title VI, 80 Stat. 1204 (1966) ).
55 See S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 20-21, Table 2 (1975).
56 Pub. L. No. 93-380, Title VI,§§ 611-621, 88 Stat. 579; 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (Supp. IV
1974), amending 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1970).
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each state was required to establish a goal of providing full educational opportunities for all handicapped children as a condition for
receiving a grant under the Act. 57 As a further prerequisite for
eligibility, the Amendments required procedural safeguards patterned on those in P.A .R .C. and Mills. 58 In an effort to assist the
states in meeting their constitutional and statutory obligations to
provide educational opportunities for all handicapped children 59 a
new entitlement formula was adopted that geared payments to the
number of children aged three · to twenty-one inclusive in the
state. 60
B.

The 1975 Act

Despite the significant boost given to education of the handicapped by the 1974 amendments, that legislation was viewed as an
interim measure by congressional supporters. 61 Subsequent legislative history revealed two major sources of dissatisfaction: inadequate funding of the state aid program, and the slowness of the
states in implementing court-mandated equal educational opportunities for the handicapped. 62 It was suggested that the federal
government would have to assume a much larger share of the cost
of ·educating handicapped children if the states were to be able to
provide the educational programs to which the millions of handicapped children were legally entitled. 63 Supporters recognized
that increased financial assistance alone would be insufficient to
speed implementation and that compliance mechanisms would also
have to be tightened. 64
The legislation that eventually emerged as the Education of All
Handicapped Children Act of 1975 was responsive to these congressional concerns. In an endeavor to provide financial assistance
to the states in amounts commensurate with the growth of special
education programming a new grant formula was developed. Beginning with fiscal year 1978 65 a state would be entitled to receive
20 U.S.C. § 1413(12)(A) (Supp. IV 1974).
20 U.S.C. § 1413(13) (Supp. IV 1974). For a discussion of the safeguards provided by the
1975 Act see Part V B infra.
••s. REP. No. 1026, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 192 (1974).
60 A state would be entitled to a maximum amount equal to $8. 75 for every child aged three
to twenty-one in the state. This formula was initially adopted in 1974 for fiscal 1975 only
(Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 614, 88 Stat. 580). The 1975 Act extended the application of this
formula through September 30, 1977 (Pub. L. No. 94-142, § 2(a), 89 Stat. 773).
61 H.R. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1975).
62 H.R. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1975); 121 CONG. REc. H7,764 (daily ed.
July 29, 1975) (remarks of Rep. Miller).
63 See S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1975).
64
121 CONG. REc. H7,764 (daily ed. July 29, 1975) (remarks of Rep. Miller).
65 Fiscal year 1978 begins on October I, 1977, and ends September 30, 1978. For the fiscal
periods from 1975 through September 30, 1977, a maximum entitlement for each state of
$8. 75 times the number of children aged three through twenty-one in that state was retained.
See note 60 supra.
57

58
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an amount of money equal to the number of handicapped children
aged three to twenty-one receiving special education multiplied by
a percentage of the average per pupil expenditure in public schools
in the United States during the second preceding year. 66 The percentage figure would escalate from 5 percent for the fiscal year
ending September 30, 1978, to 10 percent in the next fiscal year,
and then by 10 percent steps to 40 percent for the fiscal year 1982
and thereafter. 67 Although the Act contained no specific authorizations for the years after fiscal 1977, the annual cost for a fully
funded program under the new formula was estimated to be in
excess of 3.1 billion dollars by 1982. 68
Congress also took steps to remedy a second source of discontent, the slow pace of implementation of mandatory special education programs. It did so by restructuring the application and fund
disbursement procedures to make each state accountable for the
compliance of its local educational agencies. A state educational
agency would screen applications from the local agencies 69 and
then submit a single state application to the Commissioner of
Education. 70 Disbursement of funds to the state, and through it to
the local educational agencies, would be conditioned upon continuing compliance with federal mandates. 71 The burden of monitoring
local agency compliance would rest with the state agency, 72 with
the Commissioner empowered to withhold funds from any state. in
which noncompliance by a local agency was found to exist. 73 The
intention of the Congress in creating this arrangement was evidently to increase surveillance without an increase in federal manpower while at the same time creating strong incentives for the
states to exact compliance. 74 To further insure compliance Congress, as a condition of eligibility for financial assistance, required

86

20 U.S.C. § 1411(a)(l) and (4) (Supp. V 1975).
20 U .S.C. § 141 l(a)(l)(B) (Supp. V 1975). A significant feature of the 1975 Act was the
adoption of a "pass through" formula designed to assure that, beginning in fiscal year 1979,
at least 75 percent of the funds disbursed to each state under the Act would in fact reach the
local and intermediate school districts that provide most of the educational services for
handicapped children. 20 U.S.C. § 141 l(c)(I) (Supp. V 1975).
68
121 Cong. Rec. HI 1,348 (daily ed. November 18, 1975). The estimated maximum
authorization per year under the entitlement formula for fiscal year 1982 and thereafter was
$3,160,000,000. The 1975 Act also contains a provision for pro rata reduction in the event
that appropriations fail to match authorizations. 20 U.S.C. § 141l(g) (Supp. V 1975).
69
20 U.S.C. § 1414(a) (Supp. V 1975).
70 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a) (Supp. V 1975).
71
20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(b)(I) and (2), 1416(a), 1420 (Supp. V 1975).
72
20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(2) (Supp. V 1975).
73
20 U.S.C. § 1416(a) (Supp. V 1975).
74
This incentive is vitiated somewhat by§ 616(a) of the Act (20 U .S.C, § 1416(a) (Supp. V
1975)) which provides in substance that the Commissioner has the alternatives of making no
further payments to the state under the program or of limiting payments to the state
educational agency only for local agencies and intermediate units whose actions did not
cause or were not involved in the failure.
67
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each state and local educational agency to establish a complaint
procedure whereby any person dissatisfied in any respect with an
agency's special education program might enter a complaint and
obtain an impartial hearing. 75 This procedure brings problems to
the attention of state agencies 76 and the Commissioner 77 without
the necessity of mobilizing a corps of federal inspectors.
The Education of All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 contains
a number of other provisions that promise to have a significant
impact upon special education programming throughout the nation. 78 For the most part these additions have been characterized
as efforts to strengthen and clarify provisions enacted in 1974. 79
Yet, they may well transform the character of special education
programming. Moreover, they contain the seeds of a major change
in the legal contest for full educational opportunity for all handicapped children. 80
These provisions are to be found in three sections of the 1975 Act
that establish the conditions that must be met by any state or local
educational agency seeking funds under the Act. The first section
specifies the criteria for state eligibility to receive federal assistance. 81 Another section requires each state that is seeking funds
under the Act to submit a plan that details the policies and proce-

20 U.S.C. § 1415 (Supp. V 1975). See Part VB infra.
20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(3) (Supp. V 1975) provides:
In carrying out its functions under paragraph (I) [to approve or disapprove applications of local and intermediate units], each State educational agency shall consider
any decision made pursuant to a hearing held under section 1415 of this title
[section 615 of the Act], which is adverse to the local educational agency or
intermediate educational unit involved in such decision.
77 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(7) (Supp. V 1975).
78
1n addition to·the discussion that follows in the text, see Part V infra, which considers
several of these in greater detail.
'"See, e.g .. 121 CONG. REc. S20,429 (daily ed. November 19, 1975) (remarks of Sen.
Stafford).
80
See Part IV infra.
81
20 U.S.C. § 1412 (Supp. V 1975). Among the most significant criteria of eligibility are:
(I) ''The state has in effect a policy that assures all handicapped children the right to a free
appropriate public education." 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1) (Supp. V 1975).
(2) The state has developed a plan which sets forth in detail (A) an established "goal of
providing full educational opportunity to all handicapped children," a timetable for accomplishment, and a description of facilities, personnel, and services needed; (B) assurance
that free appropriate education will be available for all handicapped children aged three
through eighteen by September I, 1978, and for handicapped children aged three through
twenty-one by September I, 1980; (C) a scheme for identifying and evaluating all handicapped children in the state, and a "practical method" for determining those who are currently
receiving special education and those who are not being served; (D) certain administrative
procedures; and (E) availability of the plan to the community in advance of submission to
the Commissioner. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2) (Supp. V 1975).
(3) The state has established priorities for special education designed to reach first all
handicapped children not currently receiving special education, and secondly to assist the
most severely handicapped. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(3) (Supp. V 1975).
(4) "The State has established . . . procedural safeguards as required by [the Act]."
20 U.S.C. § 1412(5) (Supp. V 1975).
75

76
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<lures adopted by the state· with respect to education of the handicapped-and documents the state's efforts in meeting these goals. 82
Finally, to qualify for payments a local educational agency must
submit an application to the state educational agency in which it
provides assurances that the goals and criteria set forth in the Act
are being met. 83 When read together, the three sections impose the
following set of requirements.
By the target date of September 1, 1978, a free, appropriate,
public education must be available for all handicapped children
aged three to eighteen inclusive, 84 and by September 1, 1980, all
handicapped children of ages three through twenty-one must be
served. 85 An affirmative obligation is imposed upon every local
educational agency seeking funds to identify, locate, and evaluate
all handicapped children within the agency's jurisdiction. 86 The
Act also requires state and local agencies to give first priority to
implementing programs and expending funds for handicapped children not yet receiving special education. 87 The next priority is to
assist the most severely handicapped within each category who are
currently receiving an inadequate education. 88
The 1975 Act embraces the notion of individualized educational
programming designed to meet the unique needs of each child. 89
This is accomplished by means of an "individualized educational
program" (IEP) which is developed as a cooperative effort between the local educational agency involved and the child's parents
or guardians. 90 The IEP must contain a detailed explication of
educational needs, institutional goals, services to be provided, and

82

20 U .S.C. § 1413 (Supp. V 1975).
20 U .S.C. § 1414 (Supp. V 1975).
84
20 U .S.C. § 1412(2)(8) (Supp. V 1975). The Act also contains an incentive grant program
to encourage the development of special education programs for handicapped children aged
three to five, inclusive. Each state that provides special education to such children may
receive a maximum of $300 annually for each such child served, provided the program
otherwise meets the Act's requirements for eligibility. 20 U .S.C. § 1419(a) (Supp. V 1975).
85
20 U .S.C. § 1412(2)(8) (Supp. V 1975). However, this subsection excepts any state from
the requirements with respect to handicapped children aged three to five and eighteen to
twenty-one, inclusive, "if the application of such requirements would be inconsistent with
State law or practice, or the order of any court, respecting public education within such age
groups in the State .... " Id.
86
20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(l)(A) (Supp. V 1975).
87
20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(l)(C)(ii) (Supp. V 1975). See S. REP. No. 455, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
37 (1975).
88
20 U .S.C. § 1414(a)(l)(C)(ii) (Supp. V 1975).
The proposed regulations indicate that funds received under the 1975 Act may not be used
for "secondary priority children" until a free, appropriate, public education is provided for
all first priority children in the jurisdiction. Proposed Regulations,§ 12la.214, 41 Fed. Reg.
56,985 (1976). See also the summary discussion regarding "Priorities in the Use of Part 8
Funds," 41 Fed. Reg. 56,969 (1976).
89
H.R. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (1975).
90
The lEP is defined in 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19) (Supp. V 1975). The provisions and implications of the IEP are discussed in Part V A infra.
83
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appropriate objective measures of achievement that will permit
effective monitoring of the child's progress by the educational
agency and by the child's parents. 91 The IEP of every handicapped
child must be reviewed and updated at least annually .92 In addition, the "mainstreaming" of handicapped children, that is, placement in regular classrooms with children who are not handicapped
whenever possible, is a condition of eligibility for financial assistance under the Act. 93
The 1975 Act spells out in detail the due process provisions
which every educational agency must implement in order to qualify
for financial aid. 94 In addition, a complaint procedure is blueprinted for every participating state and local agency. 95 A parent of
a handicapped child may complain about any aspect of the educational program and receive a hearing before an impartial hearing
officer. 96 Any aggrieved party may appeal to the state educational
agency and finally to a state or federal court. 97
The impact upon special education programming of these provisions in the 1975 Act cannot be gauged precisely since the effect
will vary from state to state depending in part upon the extent to
which similar provisions have already been established in response
to public sentiment or judicial prodding. However, it is possible to
identify certain broad consequences which are likely to be felt
throughout the nation. The remainder of this note examines the
implications of the three major elements of the 1975 Act.

Ill. FUNDING OF EDUCATION OF THE HANDICAPPED

The Education of All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 represents a dramatic change in the philosophy of federal assistance for
the education of handicapped children. Finding that "present financial resources [of the state and local agencies] are inadequate to
meet the special educational needs of handicapped children
•• , " 98 and recognizing that, as a result of judicial mandates,
20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(19) and 1414(a)(5) (Supp. V 1975).
20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(5) (Supp. V 1975).
93
20 U.S.C. §§ 1412 (5)(8) and 1414(a)(l)(C)(iv) (Supp. V 1975). See also H.R. REP. No.
332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1975).
The proposed regulations set forth rather elaborate requirements for guaranteeing that
each handicapped child will be educated in what is referred to as the "least restrictive
environment." Proposed Regulations,§§ 121a.440-.445, 41 Fed. Reg. 56,991 (1976).
94
20 U.S.C. § 1415 (Supp. V 1975). These provisions are discussed in Part V B infra.
95
20 U.S.C. § 1415 (Supp. V 1975). See Part VB 2 infra.
96 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(l)(E) (Supp. V 1975).
97
20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(b)(2), 1415(c), 1415(e)(2) (Supp. V 1975).
98
The Education of All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, § 3(b)(8),
89 Stat. 775.
91

92
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"massive new sums of money are going to have to be spent, by
someone, on special education ... , " 99 Congress in the 1975 Act
committed the federal government to assisting state and local educational agencies in meeting their responsibilities by providing
funds to pay a portion of the direct cost of educating handicapped
children. 100 Under the Act's formula, by 1982, state and local
agencies will be entitled to receive more than an estimated 3.1
billion dollars annually for special education . 101 However, the
most sanguine observer must acknowledge that, where federal
grants are concerned, a significant gap between promise and performance may often appear. Should federal assistance fail to approach projected levels, state and local educational agencies could
face additional difficulties in the future.
During the floor debates on the 1975 Act speakers repeatedly
voiced the fear that the projected authorization figures recommended by the legislation's sponsors were not only unrealistic but
would induce expectations on the part of handicapped children and
their parents that could not be met. 102 After much handwringing
the Congress decided to retain the authorization figures and the
entitlement formula on which they were based, because the figures
represented a "costing-out" of the special education programming
required by federal and state legislation and judicial decrees. 103
Supporters acknowledged that federal expenditures in this area
might be substantially below authorization levels for the foreseeable future. 104 To remedy this conflict a new subsection providing

99

121 CONG. REC. HI 1,351 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1975) (remarks of Rep. Michel).
121 CoNG. REC. S20,428 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1975) (remarks of Sen. Stafford). See also
notes 61-68 and accompanying text supra.
101
See notes 65-68 and accompanying text supra.
102
See, e.g., 121 CoNG. REC. H7,758 (daily ed. July 29, 1975) (remarks of Rep. Ashebrooke) ("the ultimate in irresponsibility"); 121 CONG. REc. HI 1,351-52 (daily ed. Nov. 18,
1975) (remarks of Rep. Michel).
103
H.R. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1975).
10
•See, e.g., the remarks of Senator Muskie on the occasion of passage of the Conference
Report:
It is the task of the authorizing committees to identify the needs for programs
such as this . . . .
However, the probability that we will fuUy meet these needs seems small ....
[l]t strikes me as unlikely that we will be able to fund this program at the full
authorization in the near future ....
. . . I believe we need to understand clearly that large out-year authorizations,
such as those included in the bill, do not mean that we will necessarily spend at
these levels.
12 I CONG. REC. S20,436 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1975).
On March I, 1976, the.Ford Administration recommended to Congress a program that
would consolidate twenty-four educational programs into a single $3.3 billion grant to the
states for education. See Presidential Message on the Financial A:;sistance for Elementary
and Secondary Education Act, [1976] 2 U.S. CoDE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 432. See also N.Y.
Times, March 2, 1976, at 14, col. 4. The plan would eliminate the categorical grant programs
for education, including those for the education of the handicapped. Federal funds would bi
disbursed to the states, which would formulate their own allocation plans. However, ;;
100
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for the ratable reduction of allocations should the entitlements
exceed the appropriated funds was enacted. 105
Of greater concern than inflated expectations is the prospect that
the 1975 Act may actually increase the financial problems of local
and state educational agencies in meeting judicial and legislative
mandates. Three factors make this result likely. According to congressional estimates, in 1975 approximately 1.75 million handicapped children were not receiving any special education. 106 School
systems must accommodate these children in the immediate future.
Also, the 1975 Act restricts the use of aid-to-the-handicapped funds
to the payment of "excess costs." 107 An educational agency is
required to expend the same amount per pupil on handicapped as
on nonhandicapped children before it can allocate federal funds for
"excess costs." 108 Thus, absent increased local resources the average per pupil expenditure for all children must decline.
Moreover, the entitlement formula in the 1975 Act envisions a
maximum federal subvention of 40 percent of the average per pupil
cost. 109 Because the education ofa handicapped child is often quite
expensive 110 the local agency cannot depend on federal assistance

appears that they· would be required to allocate three-fourths of the funds for the education
of the poor and the handicapped. See N.Y. Times, March 2, 1976, at 14, cols. 4-5. Even if a
significant portion of the bloc grant funds were targeted for the handicapped the total would
not begin to approach the more than 3 billion dollars recommended for the years after 1980
as necessary to finance a full-service program of education for all handicapped children.
Further, it must be wondered what effect abolition of the categorical grants would have on
the compliance machinery installed in the 1975 Act. The fate of any such bloc grant program
is uncertain due to the advent of a new Administration.
105 20 U .S.C. § 141 l(g)(I) (Supp. V 1975).
106
H.R REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., I st Sess. 11 (1975). An additional 2.5 million handicapped children were reported receiving an inappropriate education. Id. See also the "Statement of Findings and Purpose" in the I 975 Act for a somewhat different set of figures. Act of
Nov. 29, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, § 3(b)(4), 89 Stat. 774.
101
20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(2)(B)(i) (Supp. V 1975). The term "excess costs" is defined in the
1975 Act, 20 U .S.C. § 1401(20) (Supp. V 1975), as
those costs which are in excess of the average annual per student expenditure in a
local educational agency during the preceding school year for an elementary or
secondary school student, as may be appropriate, and which shall be computed
after deducting (A) amounts received under this subchapter or under title I or title
VII of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of I 965, and (B) any State or
local funds expended for programs which would qualify for assistance under this
part or under such titles.
108 H.R. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., !st Sess. 13 (1975). In 121 CoNG. REc. HI 1,349 (daily
ed. Nov. 18, 1975), Congressman Quie state'd:
[T]o prevent funds from being commingled into the general education budget of a
local school district, we have mandated that the monex_ served [sic] cover only the
excess costs involved with educating handicapped children. In this way, a school
district will have to spend on a handicapped child exactly wh.at it will spend on any
other child before it can spend one penny of the Federal dollars ....
• 09 See notes 67-68 and accompanying text supra.
·
110 The average cost-index is estimated to be 1.9 times the nonhandicapped child's cost.
H.R. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1975).
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to cover all of the excess cost. Again the local agency will have to
find additional funds to meet these expenses.U'
This suggests that many states and localities may be unable to
provide a full range of educational services for all handicapped
children with the resources presently available. Moreover, unless
the states and localities are willing and able to readjust priorities to
provide significantly more funds for education of handicapped
children, they could be caught in a vicious circle, chasing federal
aid to meet constitutional and statutory obligations only to find that
the funds are insufficient and the use restrictions imposed by the
federal legislation counterproductive.
For example, recent judicial decisions provide state and local
agencies with little choice but to seek out federal funds. Yet,
federal subventions are not likely to provide sufficient additional
funds to develop full-service programs for all handicapped children.112 The problem is compounded by the terms of the 1975 Act
which require the Commissioner of Education to cut off
education-of-the-handicapped funds of any state or locality that
fails to make available a free, appropriate, public education for all
handicapped children.11 3 If an agency fails to meet the deadlines of
the Act it risks losing the funds it must have to meet the goal set by
both the courts and the 1975 Act. 114 The 1975 Act also requires that

111
One factor could reduce the strain on existing resources in some areas. If an agency is
already paying the total cost of educating some handicapped children, it may be able to shift
a portion of the excess costs to the federal program, thereby releasing funds for use in
serving newly enrolled handicapped children. See 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(9) (Supp. V 1975).
But see the "Comment" to the "nonsupplanting provision" in the proposed regulations,
§ 121a.109, 41 Fed. Reg. 56,983 (1976), which reads, "in judging compliance with this
[nonsupplanting] requirement, the Commissiqner looks to see if Part B funds are used for
any costs which were previously paid for with state or local funds." The clear indication of
the "Comment" is that 1975 Act funds may not be used to supplant state or local funds even
though the latter funds were used to cover the excess costs of educating handicapped
children. Although the requirement that 1975 Act funds shall be used to supplement existing
expenditures is sensible, it is questionable whether the gloss which the Office of Education
has apparently placed upon it is consistent with the Act's philosophy of assisting states and
localities in meeting the excess costs of educating handicapped children. While the interpretation offered in the "Comment" will have the effect of concentrating federal funds on the
education of previously excluded and inadequately served children, it will prevent the
reallocation of existing special education funds to meet the "regular" costs of serving these
children and it will penalize the states and localities that have already developed full-service
programs for many or all categories of handicapped children. If the 1975 Act is in fact
intended to assist educational agencies in meeting the excess costs of educating handicapped
children, then a way should be found to permit reallocations within special education
budgets while at the same time preventing the use of federal funds as a substitute for local
revenues.
112
Consider also in this regard the requirement that funds obtained under the Act must be
used to provide educational opportunities for all handicapped children not presently receiving special education before any of the funds may be used for the education of handicapped
children who are receiving less-than-full-service educations. See note 88 supra.
113 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(2)(8) and 1416(a)(l) (Supp. V 1975).
'14The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare has been reluctant in the past to use
the termination of funds as a compliance mechanism. Tomlinson & Mashaw, The Enforce-
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the educational agency provide an education that is appropriate to
the handicapped child's needs. 115 This provision reflects the view
that equal educational opportunity has meaning for handicapped
children only where the educational program is geared to meet
their special needs. A state or locality that fails to implement this
goal may lose its federal subvention.11 6
· Although the difficulties examined in the foregoing analysis may
be avoided, they suggest that the repercussions of the 1975 Act
reach beyond disappointed expectations. Unless the level of appropriations is increased dramatically, the 1975 Act may well be
regarded not as the culmination of the effort to obtain educational
opportunities for all handicapped children but as the beginning of
the struggle to obtain adequate funds.11 7

me'nt of FederatStandards in Grant-in-Aiil Programs: Suggestions for Beneficiary Involvement, 58 VA. L. REv. 600, 621-29 (1972).
However, a recent development promises to have a major impact in this area. Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. V 1975) provides that "[n]o
otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States ... shall, solely by reason
of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activitiy receiving Federal financial
assistance." Failure to comply with Section 504 will result in the denial or discontinuance of
all programs of federal financial assistance to the offending agency or jurisdiction. Under the
regulations proposed to implement section 504 many of the basic rights of handicapped
children that have been identified in court decisions and incorporated into the Education of
All Handicapped Children Act have been adopted in the sections dealing with elementary
and secondary education. Proposed Regulations, Subpart D, §§ 84.31-.38, 41 Fed. Reg.
29,564-65 (1976). Consequently, to receive federal funds for any educational program or
activity, an educational agency will have to satisfy the requirements set forth in these
regulations. Proposed Regulations, § 84.31 ,41 Fed. Reg. 29,564 (1976). This means that an
educational agency electing not to participate in the formula grant program of the Education
of All Handicapped Children Act will not have to meet the conditions of eligibility for the
receipt of funds under that Act. Nevertheless the agency will not qualify for federal funds
under any other program by virtue of the requirements imposed under Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
The intended linkage between Section 504 and the Education of All Handicapped Children
Act is discussed in the summary comments to the proposed regulations for the 1975 Act. 41
Fed. Reg. 56,967 (1976).
115 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(1) and 1414(a)(l)(C) (Supp. V 1975).
116But see note 114 supra.
117
The enthusiasm of state and local educational agencies may wane further if appropriations remain at or near the fiscal 1977 level. Congress appropriated $315,000,000 for state
assistance for fiscal 1977. Departments of Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare,
Appropriation Act, 1977, Act of Sept. 30, 1976, Pub. L,. No. 94-439, 90 Stat. 1418. Although
entitlements will increase annually from October 1978 through 1982, the allocations must be
ratably reduced to match appropriations. See note 105 and accompanying text supra. For
example, during the 1980-81 school year the federal subvention will be 30 percent of the
average pupil cost for each handicapped child served. If the appropriation were limited to
$300 million, the disbursement per child (assuming 8 million handicapped children) would be
$37.50. However, the average "excess cost" would perhaps· be more than one thousand
dollars per handicapped child. (The 1972-73 "estimated average expenditure for handicapped students served" was $776. Financial Assistance for Improved Educational.Services for
Handicapped Children: Hearings on H.R. 70 Before the Select Subcomm. on Education of
the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 36-37 (1974). This figure
cannot be equated with "excess cost" but it does give some indication of the order of
magnitude. For purposes of comparison, the 1972 estimated average public school expenditure per pupil was $930. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 125 (1972). The
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IV. THE IMPACT OF THE ACT ON JUDICIAL
RECOGNITION OF THE EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS OF
HANDICAPPED CHILDREN

The remainder of this note examines a pair of provisions which
can be expected to have a significant impact on future efforts to
provide educational opportunities for all handicapped children.
The implications of the "Individualized Educational Program"
(IEP) and the "complaint procedure" provisions will be viewed in
the context of the legal efforts to maximize educational opportunities for all handicapped children.
A.

Past Legal Efforts

Two distinct lines of argument have been advanced in the campaign to achieve full educational opportunities for all handicapped
children. Each line may be summarized in terms of its dominant
goals and principles .. The first has been directed primarily at overcoming the exclusion of handicapped children from public education by establishing that a handicapped child is entitled to an equal
opportunity to receive a publicly supported education where such
education has been afforded nonhandicapped childrenY 8 To protect the child's educational rights during classification and placement, the strict application of due process safeguards has also been
vigorously pressed. 119 This approach has met with remarkable
success, as is evidenced by the number of recent court decisions
and state special education acts. 120
comparable 1975 figure was $1250. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 133
(1975) ).
A threshold limitation written into the 1975 Act to encourage program efficiency may
result in further limitation on available funds. To prevent the spreading of federal funds too
thinly the Act bars the distribution of funds to any local educational agency that is entitled to
less than $7500 for the year. 20 U.S.C. § 141 l(c)(4)(A)(i) (Supp. V 1975). Again assuming a
limited appropriation which would net $37.50 per handicapped child, no system would
qualify for federal funds unless it had 200 handicapped children.
In apparent recognition of the implications of this threshold provision, Congressman
Perkins commented:
I wish to make it clear that there is no intention that the benefits of this program be
denied handicapped children in any local school district because of the $7500
limitation. That limitation only affects the flow of money. It does not affect the
extension of benefits.
The conference report [i.e., the Act] provides great flexibility in how benefits are
to be accorded handicapped children in this situation - and it may very well be and
should be that the State will simply return to the local school district Federal
moneys which would have been available to it except for the $7500 limitation.
121 CoNG. REc. HI 1,348 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1975).
""See Part I A supra.
''"See Part I B supra.
120
See Part I supra.
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The second line of argument is not as well defined. 121 The issue
is clear: whether a handicapped child participating in the educational process is receiving an appropriate and effective education.
That is, merely to remove the legal barriers to education is insufficient; the educational programs offered must address the special
needs of handicapped children. 122 However, proponents of this
view have not been able to agree on a legal theory that will secure
judicial recognition of the substantive right to the appropriate and
effective education which they seek. Efforts to advance this position have encountered judicial opposition due to the difficulties
involved in translating the notion of an appropriate and effective
education into a manageable judicial framework without requiring
the court to assume the role of an educational policymaker. 123
Passage of the Education of All Handicapped Children Act, with its
provisions for individualized educational programs and parental
complaints, may provide advocates with the means for effectively
expressing the goals and principles of the second line of argument
in a manner that is acceptable to the courts.
B. Judicial Barriers to Establishment of
the Right to an Appropriate Education

The notion of a right to an appropriate and effective education
has been used successfully to buttress complaints against the functional exclusion of children who were nominally within the educational system. Where educational agencies have not provided programs that take account of factors such as cultural or language
differences, 124 or where authorities have turned educational
facilities into little more than human warehouses, 125 this notion has
made it easier for advocates and judges to apply the equal protection doctrine even though the children have not been formally
denied an opportunity to receive ·a publicly supported education.
However, advocates have been unable to win legal recognition of a
substantive right to an appropriate and effective education. The
reasons for this failure can be seen by examining the views of the

121 Three examples of this line of argument are outlined in subsequent paragraphs of this
Part. For additional expressions of the basic legal arguments see Part I A 2 and Part I C
supra.
122 For a forceful statement of this viewpoint see McClung, supra note 20, at 166-72.
' 23 The grounds for judicial opposition are dealt with at length in Part IV B infra.
124 On cultural differences resulting in misclassification, see notes 32-33 supra: on the
failure to provide instruction in child's primary language, see Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563
(1974); Serna v. Portales Mun. Schools, 351 F. Supp. 1279 (D.N.M. 1972).
125 See, e.g .. Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (1971), 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala.
197'2). See also, McClung, supra note 20, at 162-66.
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courts in Mcinnis v. Shapiro 126 and San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez. 127
The plaintiffs in Mcinnis alleged that the system of public school
financing in Illinois violated the equal protection clause by permitting wide variations in per pupil expenditures, thereby depriving
certain students with greater educational need of a "good" education.128 The court noted, however, that in substance the claim was
"that each pupil is entitled to a minimum level of educational
expenditures, which would be signficantly higher that the existing
$400." 129 The court further noted that "[t]he underlying rationale
of the complaint is that only a financing system which apportions
public funds according to the educational needs of the students
satisfies the Fourteenth Amendment." 130
The court found two major difficulties with this argument. Considerations of educational policy, local autonomy, and lack of
judicial expertise preclude application of a standard based upon the
educational needs of students. 131 Furthermore, even if the fourteenth amendment required that expenditures be made only on the
basis of the pupils' educational needs, "[t]he only possible standard is the rigid assumption that each pupil must receive the same
dollar expenditure. Expenses are not, however, the exclusive
yardstick of a child's educational needs." 132 Concluding that dollar
equality could not be the measure of equal protection, 133 the court
then applied the minimum rationality test to the state's financing
scheme and found that the scheme did indeed reflect "a rational
policy consistent with the mandate of the Illinois Constitution." 134
In Rodriguez the plaintiffs alleged an equal protection violation
and sought to invoke the strict scrutiny standard by claiming that
the plaintiffs, as residents of an area with relatively low property
values, constituted a suspect class and that education was a fundamental interest. 135 Although the Court acknowledged that education was a matter of paramount concern in modem society, it
rejected the plaintiffs' argument that education merited treatment
126
293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968) (three-judge panel), affd sub nom. Mcinnis v.
Ogilvie. ~94 U.S. 322 (1969).
127
411 U.S. I (1973). Both Mcinnis and Rodriguez involved challenges to school financing
rather than education of handicapped children. Nevertheless, each addressed the claimed
right to an effective education.
128
Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. at 329.
129
/d. at 331 n.11.
130
/d. at 331 (emphasis in original).
131
/d. at 336.
132
/d. at 335.
133
/d. at 331 n.11, 335-36.
134
/d. at 336.
135
411 U.S. I, 16-17 (1972). For present purposes the suspect class claim may be disregarded; the discussion concentrates on the court's analysis of the fundamental interest
claim.
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as a fundamental interest. "[T]he importance of a service performed by the State does not determine whether it must be regarded as fundamental for purposes of examination under the
Equal Protection Clause." 136 The Court concluded that education
was neither explicitly nor implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.137 However, while deciding against the fundamental interest
claim on the facts presented, the Court. seemed to hold open the
possibility that a complete denial of educational opportunity might
constitute a denial of equal protection. 138
Having rejected the fundamental interest argument as presented,
the Court proceeded to apply the minimum rationality standard and
found that the Texas scheme of school financing was constitutionally sufficient. 139 In reaching that conclusion the Court undertook a
lengthy explanation of the reasons for subjecting the finance system to minimum scrutiny. Mr. Justice Powell cited a number of
factors as justifications for judicial restraint. These included the
complexities of fiscal policy, 140 the presence of "the most persistent and difficult questions of educational policy," 141 lack of judicial expertise, 142 and profound questions of federalism. 143 He concluded that "the judiciary is well advised to refrain from imposing
on the States inflexible constitutional restraints that could circumscribe or handicap the continued research and experimentation
so vital to finding even partial solutions to educational problems
and to keeping abreast of ever-changing conditions." 144
Mclnnis and Rodriguez illustrate three barriers to judicial acceptance of the right to an effective education. First, there is the
concern with discoverable and manageable judicial standards

136

1d. at 30.
1d. at 35. The plaintiffs-respondents had argued that education was "a fundamental
personal right because it is essential to the effective exercise of First Amendment freedoms
and to intelligent utilization of the right to vote." Id.
138
1d. at 36-37. The Court stated:
Even if it were conceded that some jdentifiable quantum of education is a
constitutionally protected prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of either right,
we have no indication that the present levels of educational expenditures io Texas
provide an education that falls short. Whatever merit appellees' argument might
have if a State's financing system occasioned an absolute denial of educational
opportunities to any of its children, that argument provides no basis for finding an
interference with fundamental rights where only relative differences in spending
levels are involved and where ... no charge fairly could be made that the system
fails to provide each child with an opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills
necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full participation in the
political process.
Id. at 36-37.
13
"ld. at 40-55.
140
1d. at 41.
14
'ld. at 42.
42
'
1d. at 42-43.
143
1d. at 44.
144
1d. at 43.
137
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whenever questions of educational· needs and goals are raised.
Courts are uncomfortable with the task of making educational
policy. Nor are they persuaded that they possess the capacity to
supervise the execution of those policies. Secondly, the courts
share in the widespread skepticism that equal educational opportunity can or should be measured in terms of equality of dollars
spent or the recorded progress of students. 145 Scholars have debated for some years the merits of various needs-outcomes approaches to educational equality without arriving at agreement.
The courts in both Mcinnis and Rodriguez seemed impressed by
this lack of consensus. 146 At the same time, they appeared to stress
the notion that education involves weighty issues of social policy,
encompassing matters of resource allocation as well as of societal
values with which the courts are neither properly equipped nor
entitled to deal. 147 Finally, in Rodriguez the claimaints of the right
to an effective education were thwarted by the Court's rejection of
the fundamental interest argument. This rejection was doubtlessly
a double disappointment; it failed to provide a trigger for the
application of the strict scrutiny standard of equal protection, and
it failed to provide the mandate the claimants sought for the substantive right to an effective education.
Confronted with these barriers, advocates have scouted a variety of alternative approaches. One commentator 148 sought to keep
alive the fundamental interest argument by interpreting Mr. Justice
Powell's remark in Rodriguez 149 regarding the acquisition of
minimum skills necessary for the exercise of basic constitutional
rights as an endorsement of the notion of a constitutionally guaranteed minimum education. "If this 'minimal' education is seen as
that minimum amount necessary to the meaningful exercise of first
amendment rights, then the goal could be set at, for example, an
exercise at a six th-grade level." 150 Apparently assuming that children with .certain handicaps may not be able to attain a prescribed
level of performance, the writer adds that "one's right is not the
right to the 'meaningful exercise of first amendment rights' actualized, but, rather, one's right is the right to approach such an
-·

45

Perhaps the courts also share in a misunderstanding of the thrust of the argument for
the substantive right to an effective education. Arguably, the proponents are not seeking
identical results but rather a guaranteed opportunity for every handicapped child to receive
an education that is sensitive to the special needs of the handicapped.
146
See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 43 (1972);
Mcinnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327, 336 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
' 47 San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 42-43 (1972); Mcinnis
v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327, 336 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
148
Handel, supra note 20, at 355. See also Weintraub & Abeson, Appropriate Education
for All Handicapped Children: A Growing Issue, 23 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1037 (1972).
149
San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 36-37 (1972).
""Handel, supra note 20, at 355.
'
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exercise, i.e., the right to get as far as one is able toward the
minimum." 151
Whether this approach overcomes the obstacles noted previously is questionable, however. For instance, a court would still
have to decide which skills were required for the meaningful exercise of constitutional rights. Moreover, it would also have to reach
conclusions on the appropriate pedagogy in the process of deciding
whether a handicapped child had been accorded ''the right to get as
far as one is able toward the minimum.''
Mindful of the problem of discoverable and manageable judicial
standards, another recent article analogizes the minimum program
standards for handicapped children to the core curriculum of the
schools. 152 A school that failed to develop a program of instruction
that aimed at developing a degree of proficiency in the basic skills
of reading, writing, and arithmetic might be said to have failed to
provide a minimally adequate education for the child under its
charge. "Since the school is providing or attempting to provide a
minimally adequate education for regular children, equal protection requires that they do the same for handicapped children, even
though the definition of minimally adequate education will differ
for these children." 153 This would not mean that the adequacy of
the program for handicapped children would be judged by the same
substantive standard as would be applied to the nonhandicapped,
i.e., handicapped children would not necessarily be expected to
attain the same levels of proficiency. Rather, the school would be
held responsible for developing a program that addresses the special needs of handicapped children in the same fashion that it would
be held responsible for providing instruction in reading, writing,
and arithmetic in the general curriculum. 154
Again, it is doubtful whether this approach solves the problem of
judicial determination of educational programming. A court must
still choose the content of the minimum standards it intends to
enforce. Either it adopts specific achievement or proficiency levels
as minimal-e.g., all students, handicapped and nonhandicapped,
must read at the sixth-grade level - or it must determine the kinds
of pedagogical techniques and educational services that are required to meet the special needs of handicapped children. Either
alternative requires the court to make educational policy.
Another response to the problems encountered in seeking judicial recognition of a substantive right to an adequate and effective

151

152

/d. (emphasis in original).
McClung, supra note 20, at 160.

1s3/d.
1s•1d.

FALL

1976)

Education of Handicapped Children Act

135

education has been to pursue "a procedural road to securing a
minimally adequate education." 155 This approach eschews direct
efforts to obtain judicial prescription of minimum standards for the
content of educational programs for handicapped children and asks
the courts merely to apply the standards of procedural due process
that have become their special province. To follow this path means
that "we cannot know for certain whether fair procedure will mean
an improvement in every child's education." 156 But,
[w]e can be reasonably sure, however, that such procedures,
operating in conjunction with the right to some educ.ation, will
serve as a prophylactic against the worst educati_onal malpractices ....
. . .At a minimum, the self-analysis forced upon public
policy-makers, teachers, families, and students by procedural
fairness in the school classification process insures that schools
will begin to attend precisely to real rather than imagined
needs. 157

The procedural road to adequate education is seen as an effective means of ove.rcoming judicial restraint in the area of educational policy. "Judicial action begins and ends with determining
fair procedure and enforcing the right to some education." 158
Given the intractability of many of the questions relating to educational policy, for the purposes of constitutional adjudication "that
process seems the best way to insure that no child is denied a
minimally adequate education." 159
C.

The 1975 Act-Pathway to a Substantive
Right to an Appropriate Education?

The previous discussion has reviewed the responses to the judicial barriers to recognition of a substantive right of handicapped
children to an appropriate and effective education. It may be seen
from that discussion that the problem is less one of constitutional
rights than one of effective remedies. The courts are loathe to
define the results which must be achieved by students before a
school system can be said to provide an appropriate education. The
Education of All Handicapped Children Act is significant in this
regard because it contains provisions which may substantially
155

0imond. supra note 22, at 1119.

1ss1d.
157

/d. (emphasis in original).
/d. at 1120 (emphasis in original).
159
/d. Others apparently do not share in that judgment. Handel, supra note 20, at 367,
explicitly rejects Dimond's contention, while McClung, supra note 20, at 154, feels that
counsel for handicapped children may find it necessary to resort to the substantive argument
in many instances where procedural efforts prove unavailing.
158
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eliminate the need for judicial definition of educational goals. This
result is accomplished by permitting educational agencies in cooperation with parents of handicapped children to prescribe operational goals and standards that will be applied in evaluating the
performance of both the children and the educational agencies. 160
Moreover, the 1975 Act overcomes the fear of "straightjacketing"
educational experimentation and innovation that could result from
the constitutionalizing of program requirements. 161 The provision
of an administrative complaint and appeal mechanism allays anxiety in this regard .162 Should questions of program adequacy reach
the courts, the Act structures the issues in familiar and justiciable
terms. Rather than having to decide whether an educational program meets some extrinsic standard of appropriateness and effectiveness, the court needs only to determine whether the educational agencies have adhered to statutory procedural guidelines and
whether the agencies have conscientiously endeavored to accomplish their self-prescribed educational objectives. 163
In order to suggest some of the ways in which the provisions of
the 1975 Act may open the door to more effective advocacy of the
claim to an appropriate and effective education, the next section of
this note examines the IEP and complaint procedures in some
detail. Because the implementation of these provisions may also be
expected to generate a variety of educational and legal problems,
Part V explores a number of these issues as they emerge from the
statutory language.
V. INDIVIDUALIZED EDUCATIONAL PROGRAM
AND PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS

The individualized educational program and procedural
safeguard requirements of the 1975 Act will influence the shape and
substance of special education for handicapped children in a variety of ways. The effects of these provisions on educational agencies and advocates therefore merit careful consideration.
A.

Individualized Educational Program [IEP]

As a condition of eligibility for receipt of funds under the Act a
local educational agency must provide assurance that in cooperation with the child's parents or guardians it will establish and revise
annually a written individualized educational program for each
160
See
'"'See
•••see
63
'
See

Part
note
Part
Part

V A infra.
144 and accompanying text supra.
V B infra.
V _A and B 3 infra.
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handicapped child. 164 This written report must set forth the child's
present performance, short- and long-term instructional objectives,
objective criteria and procedures for performance evaluation, and
an evaluation of the progress achieved to date. 165
This provision is intended to reinforce a general trend in the
educational community toward individualized instruction, instruction by objectives, and educational accountability . 166 However,
the greatest significance of the IEP may be the impetus it provides
for the development of educational programming appropriate to the
needs of handicapped children.
By requiring cooperative discussion and agreement on educational programs and goals, schools and parents are obliged to
consider the special needs of each handicapped child, which in turn
should generate pressure for educational programs and facilities
responsive to those needs. The absence of, or shortcomings in,
these programs and facilities will predictably be reported to school
boards, parental advisory groups, and state compliance officers, 167
thereby increasing the motivation of local and state educational
agencies to develop and fund a full range of special education
programs. i 6s
Additionally, the lii:i,king of individual needs with specific program recommendations in the IEP should reduce the incidence of
functional exclusion_ resulting from the misclassification that leads
to inappropriate placement and programming. 169 Through individualized testing and consultation, followed by individually tailored programs for children needing special education, the conditions that facilitated systematic misclassification and miseducation
should be substantially reduced. 170
164

20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(5) (Supp. V 1975).
The 1975 Act defines "individualized educational program" as
a written statement for each handicapped child developed in any meeting by a
representative of the local educational agency or an intermediate educational unit
who shall be qualified to provide, or supervise the provision of, specially designed
instruction to meet the unique needs of handicapped children, the teacher, the
parents or guardian of such child, and, whenever appropriate, such child, which
statement shall include (A) a statement of the present levels of educational performance of such child, (B) a statement of annual goals, including short-term
instructional objectives, (C) a statement of the specific educational services to be
provided to such child, and the extent to which such child will be able to participate
in regular educational programs, (D) the projected date for initiation and anticipated duration of such services, and (E) appropriate objective criteria and evaluation procedures and schedules for determining, on at least an annual basis, whether
instructional objectives· are being achieved.
20 U.S.C. § 1402(19) (Supp. V 1975).
166
See H.R. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1975).
167
See notes 201-203 and accompanying text infra.
168
See notes 113-114 and accompanying text supra.
169
See notes 36-37 and accompanying text supra.
17 °For a discussion of procedural due process that follows a similar train of thought see
Dimond,_ supra note 22, at 1118-20.
165
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Furthermore, the provisions for periodic measurement of performance based on the concrete objectives and operational measures established in the IEP meeting should make it feasible for
parents and state compliance personnel to evaluate special education programs for appropriateness and effectiveness.
The major legal significance of the IEP provision is that it facilitates the development of judicially manageable standards. The
performance objectives and measurement criteria are defined by
the educational agency, relieving the courts of the task of formulating such standards. The individualization of goals and measures
should also reduce anxiety about imposing broad, general requirements that may inhibit experimentation. Of course, the converse of
this result is that failure to comply with a specific IEP program is
not suitable for the kind of class action litigation that characterized
the struggle against exclusionary practices.
B.

Procedural Safeguards

Congress inserted a new section 171 in the 1975 Act "to clarify
and strengthen the procedural safeguards in existing law." 172 The
section pulls together three related elements: procedures for the
classification and placement of handicapped students; 173 a complaint procedure for parties dissatisfied with any aspect of the
special education program; 174 and a guarantee of ultimate legal
recourse. 175
Although it is ostensibly an effort to clarify and to strengthen
existing law, 176 the new section goes significantly beyond previous
legislation in several respects. The procedural provision, buried
among the state agency requirements in the 1974 Amendments, 177
is given a place of prominence in the 1975 Act. 178 The complaint
procedure and the federal cause of action appear for the first time
in the new legislation. 179
J. Due Process Guarantees - The procedural safeguards section outlines the familiar due process requirements of prior written
notice, access to pertinent records, explanation of the child's pro-

20 U.S.C. § 1415 (Supp. V 197.5).
S. REP. No. 455, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 48 (1975). The former due process provision had
been included in the state plan section as a condition of eligibility. 20 U .S.C. § 1413(a)(l3)
(Supp. IV 1974).
173 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(l)(A-D) (Supp. V 1975).
174 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(b)(l)(E)-1415(e)(I) (Supp. V 1975).
175 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (Supp. V 1975).
176 See note 172 and accompanying text supra.
177 20 U .S.C. § 1413(a)(l3) (Supp. IV 1974).
178 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(b), 1415(d) (Supp. V 1975).
179 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(b)(l)(E), !415(b)(2), 1415(c)(2) (Supp. V 1975).
171

172
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cedural rights in the parents' native language, diagnostic and
placement tests free from cultural bias, and reliance upon more
than one test or indicator for diagnosis and placement. 180 These
procedures are required whenever the educational agency proposes to initiate or change, or refuses to initiate or change, the
identification, evaluation, or placement of the child or refuses to
provide a free, appropriate, public education to the child. 181 The
language of the section is far from elegant, 182 but it is nonetheless
clear that Congress intended to establish procedural requirements
for all of the critical decisions of identification, classification, and
placement both before and after the child's entry into the educational process.
The efficacy of the due process guarantees may depend to a
degree upon who initiates the request for classification and placement. Where the school system proposes to test an enrolled child
for possible placement in a special education program, due process
protects the child from misclassification and inappropriate educational programming. 183 But where the child is seeking access to
special education and the educational agency either refuses admission or denies placement after testing, the due process guarantees
may be of limited utility. Unless there is a procedural irregularity
which can be used to raise doubt about the validity of the classification the most elaborate due process guarantees will not assure the
handicapped child an appropriate educational program. 184 Absent
180
20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(l)(A-D) (Supp. V 1975). See also note 39 and accompanying text
supra.
181
20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(l)(C) (Supp. V 1975). A separate, detailed set of due process
guarantees including the right to counsel, to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses,
and to written findings is specified for the complaint procedure, which may be invoked if
there is dissatisfaction with the evaluation process or placement decision. See 20 U .S.C. §
1415(b)(2) (Supp. V 1975). See also Part V B 2 infra.
182
The awkward phrasing derives from the fusion of provisions directed at the problem of
exclusion with provisions applicable to classification and placement.
183 20 U .S.C. §§ 1402(19), 1414(a)(5), 1415(b)(I) and (2) (Supp. V 1975). The 1975 Act in
effect mandates a two-step procedure for protecting the child against misclassification and
inappropriate placement. The first stage is comprised of carefully monitored testing coupled
with parental involvement in the establishment of the IEP. The second stage is prnvision for
an impartial hearing in the event of parental objection to any facet of the first stage
proceedings.
The procedural safeguards section does not address the question of what happens if the
parents of a handicapped child refuse to consent to evaluation or placement. These matters
are also considered briefly at note 207, infra. However, the proposed regulations attempt to
clarify this matter by providing that "[a] meeting may be conducted without a parent in
attendance if the local educational agency is unable to convince the parents that they should
attend. In this case the local educational agency must have a record of its attempts to
arrange a mutually agreed on [sic] time and place, ... " Proposed Regulations, §
12la.224(c), 41 Fed. Reg. 56,986 (1976). On the other hand, the proposed regulations also
expressly require parental consent to an evaluation before it may be conducted. Proposed
Regulations, § 12la.404(b), 41 Fed. Reg. 56,990 (1976).
184
On the other hand, a careful evaluation of the educational needs of the child who
requests access to special education undoubtedly maximizes the probability of proper
classification. Assuring the availability of this type of evaluation may be the most important
effect of the due process guarantees. See Dimond, supra note 22, at 1119.
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a procedural irregularity, the interests of the child can be protected
in an instance of agency denial of admission or placement only if
the decision is opened to examination and challenge. Doubtless it
was this realization that prompted congressional 'sponsors to add a
complaint procedure to the 1975 Act. 18 ~ •
2. Complaint Procedure - Any educational agency seeking federal assistance under the Act is required to provide "an opportunity to present complaints with respect to any matter relating to the
identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or
the provision of a free appropriate public education to such
child." 186 This provision is critical because it invites complaints
not only on the matters of access and classification which have
dominated the agendas of advocates and courts to date, but also on
matters of appropriateness and accountability. 187
Section 1415 also details the rights and duties associated with the
processing of the complaint. The complainant is entitled to a hearing conducted by the appropriate educational agency before an
impartial hearing officer who is not an employee of the agency . 188
The complainant has a right to appeal the findings or decision of the
hearing' officer to the state educational agency . 189 In the hearing
the parties have the right to counsel; to present evidence; toquestion, cross-examine, and compel the attendance of witnesses; to a
verbatim record; and to a written statement of findings. 190
3. Effec'ts of the Complaint Procedure - The complaint procedure should strengthen compliance by calling alleged violations of
185
The House version of the bill, H.R. 7217, contained a separate section(§ 617) which
required each state to establish a grievance procedure. Neither the Senate bill (S. 6) nor
previous legislation provided a clear indication of the recourse available to children
excluded from special education programs. The Conference Committee agreed to the incorporation of most of the House bill's grievance procedure into the final version of the Act as
part of a new "Procedural Safeguards" section. s: REP. No. 455, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 47-48
(1975).
186 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(I)(E) (Supp. V 1975).
187
There can be no doubt as to the intended breadth of this provision. In the words of
Senator Williams, the chairman of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare:
I would like to stress that the language referring to "free appropriate public
education" [in the clauses providing for parental complaints] has been adopted to
make clear that a complaint may involve matters such as questions respecting a
child's individualized educational program, questions of whether special education
and related services are being provided without charge to the parents of [sic J
guardians, questions relating to whether the services provided a child meet the
standards of the State educational agency, or any other question within the scope
of the definition of "free appropriate public education." In addition, it should be
clear that a parent or guardian may present a complaint alleging that a State or local
educational agency has refused to provide services to which a child may be entitled
[or) alleging that the State or local educational agency has erroneously classified a
child as a handicapped child when, in fact, that child is not a handicapped child.
121 CONG. REc. S20,432 (daily ed. November 19, 1975).
Because of its broad significance, this provision receives extended treatment in Part VB 3
infra.
188
20 U .S.C. § 1415(b)(2)(Supp. V 1975). See notes 192-203 and accompanying text infra.
189
20 U .S.C. § 1415(c) (Supp. V 1975).
190
20 U.S.C. § 1415(d) (Supp. V 1975).
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state and local plans to the attention of the state educational agency
and the Commissioner of Education, both of which have the authority to withhold funds for noncompliance. 191
Less obvious perhaps is the influence of the complaint provision
on the framing of issues. The statute requires the complaint to be
heard before an impartial hearing officer who is not an employee of
the educational agency involved in the education or care of the
child. 192 The method of selection of the hearing officer is not
discussed in the I 975 Act. Presumably it is left to state and local
procedures. 193 Nor is the precise authority of the hearing officer
revealed by the statutory language. Evidently he is expected to
conduct an adversary hearing in which the representatives of the
handicapped child may cross-examine the educational and testing
personnel and present expert witnesses. 194 Since the complaint
may encompass "the identification, evaluation, or educational
placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate
education to such child," 195 the hearing officer has the implicit
authority to render decisions on any of these matters. 196
Complaints by parents of handicapped children may challenge
the decisions of the educational agency or the adequacy of the
educational program. With respect to agency decisions the complaint may either challenge the procedures used in the identification, evaluation, and placement of the child, or the result of these
procedures - the substantive decisic,n to classify and place the
child in one program or another. Procedural challenges are perhaps
the most amenable to review. The list of procedural rights recognized by the courts has been articulated in the 1975 Act as a
condition for receipt of federal funds. By examining witnesses and
191
Consider the interrelation between 20 U.S.C. §§ J415(d), 1413(a)(l2), l4l4(b)(2), and
20 U.S.C. § 1418 (Supp. V 1975). See also note 22 and accompanying text infra.
192
20 U.S.C. § 14l5(b)(2) (Supp. V, 1975).
193
8111 see note 197 infra.
194
The Act does not specify the modus operandi of the hearing, presumably leaving this
matter to the states. However, the Act does require the states to grant the parties various
rights-to counsel, to present evidence, to examine and cross-examine withesses, to a
verbatim record, and to written findings-which have the effect of mandating a trial-type
proceeding. See 20 U.S.C § l4l5(d) (Supp. V 1975).
The proposed regulations are silent regarding the procedural contours of the complaint
hearing. See 41 Fed. Reg. 56,990 (1976).
195
20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(l)(E) (Supp. V 1975).
'""The Conference Report states that "language is adopted to assure that: (a) any parent
or guardian may present a complaint concerning any matter regarding the identification,
evaluation, or educational placement of the child or the provision of a free appropriate
public education to such a child." S. REP. No. 455. 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 48-49 (1975)
(emphasis in original).
It is uncertain whether the sweeping authority that the drafters have apparently conferred
upon the hearing officer represents an abiding faith in the adversary process or merely a
failure to consider fully the implications of the provisions they have drafted. One suspects a
preoccupation with providing a mechanism to combat exclusionary practices and with
guaranteeing procedural due process in testing and placement decisions.
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producing expert testimony the complainant may demonstrate that
his p_rocedural rights have been denied. The effect of this demonstration is not clear, however. Presumably, the hearing officer may
order the retesting of the child, or on the basis of the substantive
evidence presented he may order placement in a specific program.191
Substantive challenges are more problematic. When the placement choice of the educational agency is challenged by the complainant, the alternatives for the hearing officer are to order retesting
or to place the child, whether by endorsing the agency's choice or
by making a new disposition. In the latter instance the hearing
officer-substitutes his judgment for that of the educational agency's
personnel. Despite possible reservations about placing this decision in the hands of a lay person 198 the interests of the educational
agency and of the child are protected in some measure by the
opportunity to appeal the decision to the state educational agency
and to the courts. 199
It is more difficult to assess the events that would follow the
submission of a complaint questioning the appropriateness or
adequacy of an educational program in which a handicapped child
is enrolled. A dispute might arise between the child or his parents
and the educational agency concerning the objectives to be pursued in the individualized educational program. In resolving this

197
This po·wer raises an intriguing question as to the qualifications of the hearing officer.
The statute makes no mention of qualifications, except that the person may not be an
employee of the agency charged with the education or care of the child. 20 U .S.C. §
1415(b)(2) (Supp. V 1975). May he (or must he) be a person familiar with the education of
handicapped children, for example, a special education consultant? If so, the complainant
may suspect that his decision will be biased in favor of his professional colleagues in the
educational agency. Yet, ifhe is a layman, he may be asked to make a difficult placement
decision based upon technical data with which he lacks a working familiarity.
The Council for Exceptional Children has apparently opted for expertise. In an article that
excerpts portions of the Council's publication, A Primer on Due Process, a number of
recommendations are made regarding the selection of hearing officers for the type of
"impartial due process hearing" mandated by the 1975 Act. One of the recommendations
reads: "Individuals selected should: ... 2. Possess special knowledge, acquired through
training and/or experience, about the nature and needs of exceptional children. An awareness and understanding of the types and quality of programs that are available at any time for
exceptional children is essential." Abeson, Bolick & Haas, A Primer on Due Process:
Education Decisions for Handicapped Children, 42 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 68, 72-73
(1975).
The proposed regulations add to the uncertainty regarding the hearing officer's qualifications by providing that "[a] hearing must not be conducted: ... [b]y any person having a
personal or professional interest which would conflict with his or her objectivity in the
hearing." Proposed Regulations, § 12 la.407(a)(2) 41 Fed. Reg. 56,990 (1976). Is an expert on
the education of handicapped children barred by this provision from serving as a hearing
officer? Or is professional training sufficient insulation against loss of objectivity? One may
only hope that the final regulations will further clarify the eligibility requirements for hearing
officers.
198
See note 197 supra.
199
See Part V B 4 infra.
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dispute the hearing officer would be obliged to set forth the educational goals which the child and the agency are expected to
achieve. A profound faith in the adversary process is required to
believe that this procedure win assure the handicapped child an
appropriate education.
Where the adequacy of the funding, personnel, or curriculum of
the educational program is the target of the complaint, the hearing
must address issues that are more complex than the investigation
of procedural irregularities or the selection of an appropriate educational program. Having observed the hesitancy of the judiciary
to tackle questions of funding and programming, 200 one may anticipate a hearing officer will be similarly trepidacious. Thus, the
primary importance of the hearing in this context may be to trigger
program review by state and federal officials since the 1975 Act
requires that the findings and decision of the hearing officer be
transmitted to the state advisory paneI. 201 The advisory panel is
charged with the duty to advise the state educational agency of
unmet needs within the state and to assist the state in reporting
developments to the Commissioner of Education. 202 In other
words, the l}earing may function primarily to draw administrative
attention to the substantive issues of appropriate and adequate
programming. 203
The adversarial nature of the complaint hearing should also be
taken into account in assessing the impact of the 1975 Act's complaint provision. Unlike the decrees in P.A.R.C. and Mills, 204 the
1975 Act is silent on the allocation of the burden of proof in the
hearing. Yet the practical significance of this matter renders it
advisable to speculate briefly on how this allocation may be made.
Ostensibly, where an educational agency has initiated a change
in educational status, it may be required under traditional administrative law principles to carry the burdens of production and persuasion. 205 Similarly, where a school system rejects a parental
request to enroll a child in a special education program, the school
may have to justify its decision. If a procedural irregularity can be
found, the burden of production may be shifted to the agency to
defend its actions. Nevertheless, in the absence of an express
mandate in state education or administrative law it is difficult to
suppose that even in these circumstances the decision of the educa200

See notes 126-147 and accompanying text supra.
20 U.S.C. § 1415(d)(4) (Supp. V 1975).
202
20 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(l2) (Supp. V 1975).
203
For persons who are pessimistic about the efficacy of administrative solutions, the 1975
Act also provides for eventual judicial review of the complaint. See Part V B 5 infra.
•••see note 39 supra.
205
See, e.g., The Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1970); K.
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 287 (3d ed. 1972).
201
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tional agency will not carry a presumption of validity that will
effectively place the production- and persuasion-burdens on the
complainant.
Situations may be hypothesized in which at a minimum the
production-burden would be shifted one way or another, but one
suspects that a hearing officer will seldom require an educational
agency to establish the validity of a challenged placement decision
or educational program without first requiring the complainant to
show that the procedural guidelines were violated or that the agency's decision was probably in error. And regardless of where the
burden of persuasion is formally placed, the complainant will undoubtedly have to overcome the presumption of validity that attaches to the judgments of the educational experts. 206
While the format of the complaint hearing may be expected to
channel disputes in predictable ways, the very existence of a complaint and hearing procedure will influence the provision of educational services for handicapped children. The complaint and hearing procedure serves to bestow legitimacy upon. the position of the
complainant. Recognizing the right of the parents of a handicapped
child to enter a complaint necessarily implies that the needs and
opinions of the child and his parents are entitled to the fullest
consideration. This recognition does not necessarily mean that
educational agencies have been insensitive to these matters, only
that the child's position is elevated from that of beneficiary to that
of co-decisionmaker. Depending upon the degree of objectivity of
parents of handicapped children, results may range from increased
parental awareness and involvement to the chaos borne of incessant complaints that may yield educational practices akin to "defensive medicine. " 207
206
Handel has outlined the pendular shifts in the burden of production which may be
anticipated when challenging the adequacy of an.educational program. He also notes that the
burden of persuasion falls upon the complainant to show that despite adherence to professional standards the child has not received an adequate education. See Handel, supra note
20.
•
201
Regarding the pivotal role of the parents in the struggle for recognition of the educational rights of handicapped children, one writer has observed that
deeply rooted in our legal and sociological heritage is the position that parents are
the natural guardians of their children. Implicit in such a position is the belief that
there is an identity or, at least, compatibility of interest between the parent and the
child as well as a capability on the part of the parent to care for and deal with the
child and represent him in his dealings with society's institutions. However, the
time may have come to challenge this fundamental assumption.
Murdock, Cil'i/ Rights of the Mentally Retarded: Some Critical Issues, 48 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 133, 137 (1972).
Insufficient attention has been given to the legal problems created by disbelieving or
recalcitrant parents. This lack of attention is perhaps understandable in view of the leading
role taken by parents in the legal struggle for educational rights of the handicapped. Whether
the elaborate procedural safeguards mandated in the 1975 Act will protect the interests of a
handicapped child where the parents refuse to permit the child to be enrolled in a special
education program is questionable. Conceivably, an educational agency may use the com-
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The effect of the interplay of the complaint and hearing, the
mandated due process procedures, and the goals of appropriate
and adequate educational programming should also be noted. The
complaint and hearing provisions reinforce the guarantees of
adequate, unbiased testing and placement and of individualized
educational _programming. Provision for a complaint and hearing
means that failure to comply with the due process and IEP requirements will come to the attention of persons with the power to
compel performance by withholding funds. 208 More importantly,
perhaps, educational personnel are motivated to exercise their best
professional judgments by an awareness that their decisions must
withstand scrutiny by their peers and by those who review complaints. The impact of this factor cannot be measured in terms of
individualized complaints resolved, but its significance for the
overall quality of the educational program should not be underestimated.
4. Appeal to the State Educational Agency - "[A]ny party
aggrieved by the findings and decision rendered [by the hearing
officer] may appeal to the State educational agency .... " 209 In
contrast with the complaint hearing where the opportunity to present a complaint is accorded only to "the parents or guardian," 210
an administrative appeal may be taken either by the parents or
guardian or by the local educational agency. 211 The state educa-

plaint procedure to force a hearing on the placement of a child that the agency believes to be
handicapped where the parents refuse to sanction placement. However, where state or local
procedures require parental consent before any testing or evaluation may take place, it is not
clear whether the complaint procedure would be available to the educational agency.
The proposed regulations permit an IEP meeting without parental involvement, but forbid
evaluation of a child suspected of manifesting a handicap without parental consent. See note
183 supra.
268
See note 191 and accompanying text supra.
209
20 U.S.C. § 1415(c) (Supp. V 1975).
21
°20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2) (Supp. V 1975). But see Proposed Regulations,§ 12la.406(a), 41
Fed. Reg. 56,990 (1976), which states that "[a] parent or a local educational agency may
initiate a hearing on any of the matters described in § 121a.404(a)(I) and (2)." The latter
regulation rephrases 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(l)(C), (D) (Supp. V 1975) pertaining to proposals to
initiate, change, or deny evaluation, placement, or programming for a handicapped child.
See Part V 8 2 supra.
211
The right of appeal is restricted to an aggrieved party. What constitutes an aggrieved
party is not indicated. Absent such an indication, virtually any dissatisfaction with the
decision of the hearing officer is presumably sufficient justification for administrative appeal.
A more difficult question of standing to appeal would be presented by the request for
administrative review brought by a public interest association that seeks to represent
handicapped children. Historically, organizations such as the Pennsylvania Association for
Retarded Children have been instrumental in obtaining judicial recognition of the education
rights of handicapped children. The goals of an association seeking participation in order to
represent the interests of a handicapped child may conflict at times with those of the parents
of the handicapped child. A situation may be imagined in which the parents of children on
whose behalf the complaint was entered have decided to accept the hearing officer's
disposition despite the association's objection. The association may believe that the decision
was incorrect or that the findings of the hearing officer have broader ramifications that will
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tional agency is required to conduct an "impartial review" 212 of
the prior hearing. 213 "The officer conducting such review shall
make an independent decision upon completion of such review. "214
The scope of review is not clear from the statutory language.
However, there are two basic possibilities; an independent decision
based upon review of the record below or a de novo hearing. The
Act is ambiguous in that it refers to a state agency review of the
prior hearing, which implies that the hearing below is to be the
point of departure, yet it also grants the same due process rights as
at the first hearing, including the rights to present evidence and to
confront, cross-examine, and compel the attendance of witnesses,
thereby implying more than mere record review. 215
The legislative history does not remove the ambiguity.
It is not intended that the review conducted by the state educational agency must necessarily be a de novo review although the
reviewing officer should carefully examine the entire record of
the hearing, afford parties an opportunity for oral argument,
and assure that the procedures followed at the hearing were
consistent with due process. 216

The impl_ication from the Senate floor debate is that the reviewing
officer has an option to choose the mode of review, albeit with the
assurance of an opportunity for aggrieved parties to present an oral
argument. 217
On the other hand, the nature of the review hearing will often be
governed by the nature of the issues raised. A due process complaint may be resolved on the basis of the record below, while a

be detrimental to the interests of other handicapped children. Under such circumstances it is
unclear whether the association has or should have the right of appeal.
The complexities of the standing doctrine cannot be unraveled here. On recent developments in the administrative area see K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES.
289-95. 485-528 (1976). However. with respect to the situation hypothesized in the foregoing
paragraph one point merits discussion. The notion that a third party should be allowed to
press an appeal in the face of opposition by the parents or guardian of the child may seem
inconsistent with basic jurisprudence. Yet all too frequently the comfortable assumption
that the parents necessarily share an identity of interest with their handicapped child may
not be empirically defensible. See Murdock, supra note 207. If the child is truly the
~ggrieved party. then on some occasions his interest may be better served by permitting a
third party to appeal.
212 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c) (Supp. V 1975).
213
The Act does not discuss the qualifications of the reviewing officer. Presumably the
reviewing officer will be an official of the state department of education.
214
20 U.S.C. § 1415(c) (Supp. V 1975).
215 20 U.S.C. § 1415(d) (Supp. V 1975).
216
121 CONG. REc. S20.433 (daily ed. Nov. 19. 1975) (remarks of Sen. Williams).
217 The Act specifies neither the standard of review to be applied by the reviewing officer,
nor the intended scope of review. The proposed regulations shed no light on these matters
either.
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question of program adequacy may require a de novo hearing at
which the policy questions that necessarily surround such matters
may be fully ventilated. 218 Questions of placement appear to fall
into a grey area between the two extremes since it may be possible
to resolve them on the basis of written evaluations and affidavits,
yet they may also involve matters of educational policy and program capabilities.
Perhaps the most that can be said with certainty regarding state
agency review is that the guarantee of due process safeguards
presses in the direction of a trial-type hearing and that the reviewing officer is required to make an independent judgment. Since the
Act does not restrict the reviewing officer to a decision based upon
evidence in the record, it may be expected that he will conduct a
wide-ranging inquiry whenever it is necessary for him to take
account of broader issues of educational policy in rendering his
decision.
The relationship between state agency review and the statutory
compliance machinery must also be considered. The 1975 Act
requires a state agency in carrying out its responsibilities for
screening local agency applications to "consider any decision
made pursuant to a hearing held under [section 1415] which is
adverse to the local educational agency or intermediate educational
unit involved in such decision. " 219 The local agencies may be
expected to contest vigorously any decision of a hearing officer
that casts doubts on local compliance. 220 However, the Act requires the state to provide a local agency with the opportunity for a
hearing before the state may find a violation. 221
5. Judicial Review of the Complaint Process - Congress was
not content to rely upon the administrative appeal procedure to
protect the interests of handicapped children. It also offered any
aggrieved party "the right to bring a civil action with respect to the
complaint presented pursuant to this section ... in any State court
of competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the United States
without regard to the amount in controversy. " 222 Again, it is unclear whether the scope of the judicial review contemplated by the
statute calls for appellate review of an adjudicatory proceeding or
for a de novo judicial determination of the dispute. However,~the
statute provides some hints of the legislative intent. The right to
bring a civil action is granted to parties aggrieved by the findings
218
State agency review may be the best forum to consider the broader policy dimensions
of programming and placement oecause of the presumed access of state officials to the
requisite data and reports.
219
20 U .S.C. § 1414(b)(3) (Supp. V 1975).
220
Similarly. the local agency may be expected to press for judicial review of the state
review proceedings. See Part V B 5 infra.
22
'20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1975).
222
20 U .S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (Supp. V. 1975).
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and decision of either the initial hearing or the state agency review. 223 Furthermore, the court is instructed to "receive the records of the administrative proceedings .... " 224 These references,
together with the placement of the civil action provision within the
procedural safeguards section, 225 suggest that the court is expected
to undertake the more limited appellate review of the agency decision, rather than a de novo review.
However, these indicia are balanced by others which suggest a
more expansive judicial role. The grant of a right to bring a civil
action is expressly linked to the "complaint presented pursuant to
this section" 226 rather than to the decision of the hearing or review
officer. This language is echoed in the Conference Report which
specifically provides that the aggrieved party's right to bring a civil
action extends "to the original complaint and matters relating
thereto. " 227 Further, the court is instructed to hear additional
evidence at the request of a party and to "grant such relief as the
court determines is appropriate. " 228 These elements evidence an
intention to accord aggrieved parties the opportunity to receive a
de novo judicial determination on the merits of the dispute.
On balance, it seems that the Act allows a court to undertake a
broad review of the disputed issues of placement and programming
as well as a review of the prior administrative proceedings in which
these issues have been considered and decided.
The prospective involvement of the judiciary in the determination of issues of educational placement and programming suggests
two points for brief consideration. The first involves the doctrine of
the exhaustion of administrative remedies. 229 The sequence to be
223

20 U.S.C. ·§ 1415(e)(2) (Supp. V 1975).

22•1d.
225
The paragraph that recognizes the right of civil action is preceded by a paragraph that
declares that the decision of the hearing or review officer shall be final, "except that any
party involved in such hearing may appeal such decision under the provisions" for state
agency review or right of civil action. 20 U .S.C. § 1415(e)(I) (Supp. V 1975). The proposed
regulations are silent with regard to the scope of judicial review.
226
20 U .S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (Supp. V 1975).
227
S. REP. No. 455, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1975).
228
20 U .S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (Supp. V 1975).
229
This doctrinal label is applied because from a common sense perspective the core issue
is whether an aggrieved party will be required to follow the channels of administrative
review before the court will entertain a challenge to local or state agency determination. This
question seems to be one of timing, i.e., when the court will review the agency action. Thus,
the exhaustion doctrine should be applied. See K. DAVIS, AoMINSTRATIVE LAw TEXT 373
(3d ed. 1972). However, the framework of the procedural safeguards section suggests
another possibility. Even if the statutory language which confers a right of civil action upon
an aggrieved party is read to apply only after an initial complaint has been made to·the local
agency and after a hearing has been held, a disgruntled parent may try to bring a civil action
regarding the initial placement determination in lieu of invoking the complaint procedure. In
this situation, the threshold question before the court would be whether it should apply the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction and require an agency to consider the substance of the
complaint before the court will hear the complaint. See id. Presumably, the policy considerations are similar, but the distinction illustrates further the ambiguities contained in the
provision of the Act granting a right to bring a civil action. ·
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followed in obtaining review of a local agency's placement or
programming decision in the typical case seems clear. The parent
or guardian enters a complaint and receives a hearing. If there is
dissatisfaction with the outcome, an administrative review is obtained. The right of civil action is involved only after the administrative review is completed. 230
However, the parents or guardian may wish to short-circuit this'
procedure, particularly if the purpose is to establish a precedent
regarding the education of handicapped children rather than simply
to challenge a placement decision. 231 This purpose may be accomplished without reference to the right of civil action conferred
by the 1975 Act. 232 Alternatively, the potential plaintiffs may seek
to avail themselves of the statute's right of civil action. In either
case the court must decide whether to apply the exhaustion
doctrine. Several reasons may be advanced in favor of its application.
Perhaps the most obvious reason for requiring exhaustion is that
the issues may be resolved within the administrative framework
without the need for judicial involvement, particularly where the
complaint involves procedural matters. Since the procedural requirements have been set forth in detail, an administrative officer
will be able to determine compliance in most cases. Where sub-

230
That the parties are required to follow these steps may be inferred from the statutory
language:
Any party aggrieved by the findings and decision made under subsection (b) [the
complaint-hearing provision] who does not have the right to an appeal under
subsection (c) of this section [the state review hearing]. and any party aggrieved by
the findings and decision under subsection (c) of this section, shall have the right to
bring a civil action with respect to the complaint . . . .
20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (Supp. V 1975). This language seems to require the exhaustion of
administrative remedies except for the party prevailing at the complaint hearing.
23
'For example, in a recent Pennsylvania case, Fialkowski v. Shapp. 405 F. Supp. 946
(E.D. Pa. 1975). the parents of two severely mentally retarded children claimed that the
children were denied equal protection because the local and state school officials failed to
provide them with an appropriate education. While the plaintiffs were seeking monetary
damages, the complaint in substance raised the issues of whether the state was required to
provide each child with an education appropriate to the child's needs and whether the
program provided was adequate.
232
Among the possibilities not further discussed in this Note are:
(I) A constitutional claim of violation of equal protection.
(2) An action in the nature of mandamus against the Commissioner of Education requiring
him to withhold funds under the terms of the Education of All Handicapped Children Act. 20
U .S.C. § 1416(a) (Supp. V I 975). or against the state and local educational agencies that are
recipients of funds under the 1975 Act to obtain compliance with the congressional requirements. (See K. DAVIS, supra note 229. at 447-51. See also Tomlinson & Mashaw, The
Enforcement of Federal Standards in Grant-in-Aid Programs: Suggestions for Beneficiary
lnl'Olvement, 58 VA. L. REV. 600. 630-37 (1972)).
(3) An implied right of action as beneficiary of the Education of All Handicapped Children
Act against the state and local educational agencies claiming a violation of the terms and
conditions of the Act. See. e.g., Mattie T. v. Johnston, No. DC-75-31-S (N.D. Miss .. filed
April 25, 1975), noted in 9 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. I 13 (1975).
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stantive issues of appropriateness of education and program
adequacy are involved, there may be less prospect for effective
resolution on the administrative level, but considerations of efficiency still indicate that administrative review should be attempted
first. Indeed, where educational programming is at the center of the
conflict, one may expect that a court will welcome the input of
state education officials in addition to a full development of the
record. Nor should a court be expected to overlook the panoply of
procedural safeguards mandated in the 1975 Act, including the
right of civil action, which was installed to achieve compliance by
means of administrative supervision. 233 A premature consideration
of the complex issues of educational placement and programming
would waste judicial resources.
However, a court should not automatically refrain from hearing
a complaint concerning placement or programming until all administrative remedies have been exhausted. There may be occasions when administrative recourse would be futile. 234 On those
occasions the court should not apply the exhaustion doctrine. 235
There may be other occasions when the issues call for judicial
decision without regard to the possibility of administrative review,
for example, where the exclusion of a handicapped child from the
educational system is allegedly based upon a state administrative
interpretation of statutory language.
Notwithstanding the potential application of the exhaustion doctrine, the effect of the civil action provision will be to involve the
courts more deeply in the formulation and execution of educational
policy, providing an ironic twist to the implications of the 1975 Act.
It was suggested previously 236 that one effect of the IEP would be
to relieve the courts of the task of formulating educational policy
and standards of performance in actions involving education of the
handicapped to the extent that the written individualized educational programs will spell out educational objectives and perform-

233

See notes 201-203 and accompanying text supra.
See, e.g., Fialkowski v. Shapp. 405 F. Supp. 946 (E.D. Pa. 1975), wherein the plaintiffs
contended that the review procedures adopted by Pennsylvania after the P.A.R.C. decision
were inadequate to address the issue of appropriate education raised by the plaintiffs.
Apparently the state Secretary of Education reyiewed only the procedures involved in the
initial hearing and whether the evidence presented by the school personnel justified the
classification made. The district court all but endorsed the notion that unless the review
procedures permitted review of the substance of complaints regarding the inadequacy or
inappropriateness of the educational programs, they did not afford an adequate administrative remedy. 405 F. Supp. at 957.
235
l n reviewing the Conference Report on the floor of the Senate one sponsor informed his
colleagues that exhaustion of the administrative procedures should not be required where
such action "would be futile either as a legal or practical matter." 121 CONG. REC. S20,433
(daily ed. Nov. 19, 1975) (remarks of Sen. Williams).
236
See Part V A supra.
234
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ance measures. One conclusion that may be drawn for the present discussion of the complaint and civil action provisions is that
they will operate at cross purposes with the IEP in this regard.
While the courts may be able to glean manageable judicial standards from the individualized educational programs, thereby avoiding the need to set educational objectives, they may be called upon
more frequently to decide whether the programs provided by educational agencies are appropriate to the needs of handicapped
children and are being carried out effectively.
Another effect of increased judicial participation may be contemplated with restrained enthusiasm. One unfortunate prospect of
the establishment of individualized educational programs is the
possibility of harassment and unrealistic demands by parents dissatisfied with their child's special education program and the results obtained thereby. For example, the provision for individualized educational programs may blur the distinction between
reasonable objectives and attainment. Many ingredients must be
combined to produce a successful education experience. Yet the
IEP may encourage dissatisfied parents to blame the educational
personnel or the lack of equipment or other supporting services
when the projected goals are not met. Of course, such criticism
may be deserved. Yet, it must be wondered whether the educational needs of handicapped children can be adequately served
should agency personnel find themselves devoting a significant
portion of their time to preparing for and participating in administrative and judicial proceedings. The legacy of the procedural
safeguards provision of the 1975 Act may be the development of
educational programs that are more attuned to the legal system's
need for enforceable legal standards than to the complex needs of
handicapped children.

VI. CONCLUSION

Senator Harrison Williams, the chief Senatorial sponsor of the
Education of All Handicapped Children Act, described it as "the
most important Federal legislation affecting American public education since the enactment of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. " 237 An assessment of the accuracy of this
prediction will require many years. However, it is not too soon to
draw a number of conclusions regarding this legislation.

237

121 CONG. REC. S20,430 (daily ed. Nov. 19. 1975).

152

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 10:110

The 1975 Act may be expected to shape programs of education
for handicapped children in at least three ways. The prospect of
federal aid to assist in meeting the costs of educating handicapped
children, coupled with the eligibility deadlines imposed, will speed
implementation of education programs designed to meet the special
needs of all handicapped children in the United States. Although
the promise of large-scale federal financial support may prove
illusory, the commitment to support the direct costs of special
education will provide proponents with significant leverage when
seeking larger sums in the future. In addition the IEP and procedural safeguards provisions will undoubtedly influence the form
and substance of education for the handicapped in ways ranging
from individualized educational programming to state administrative scrutiny of program quality and performance.
The 1975 Act also promises to reshape litigation in this area in a
variety of ways. Although constitutional claims will continue to
challenge exclusionary practices, the emphasis should shift toward
the issue of the child's substantive right to an appropriate and
effective education. The Act's provisions establishing placement
procedures, complaints and judicial review will channel more disputes over placement and program performance into the courts.
Despite the Act's prescription of administrative review, the courts
may be expected to become more intimately involved in piacement
and programming determinations as a result of this legislation.
Perhaps the most notable implication of the 1975 Act, however,
is its role as a symbol of a changing attitude toward handicapped
persons, for the Act represents the commitment of the nation to
equal educational opportunity as a birthright for all handicapped
children.
-Donald W. Keim

